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Abstract
The Internet is an evolving ecosystem where a multitude of interconnected networks, or Au-
tonomous Systems (ASes), support global connectivity of end users. By providing economic in-
centives for routing traffic on behalf of other networks, interconnection agreements between ASes
are a cornerstone of the Internet. However, rapid Internet adoption, unrelenting traffic growth, and
increasing demands for quality and performance are challenging to cope with, provoke recurrent
conflicts over the economic settlement of interconnections, and question the capacity of the Inter-
net to provide critical services. Furthermore, with their capital-intensive network infrastructure,
the ASes’ need to recover costs complicates interconnection negotiations and settlements. Over-
coming the limitations and bottlenecks of the evolving Internet ecosystem, requires understanding
the economics of how networks interconnect and how traffic is routed through them.
This thesis studies the economic aspects of the interconnections between ASes, identifies
challenges hampering the future of the Internet, and proposes solutions to resolve them. We begin
by presenting the first analytical and empirical study on remote peering, an emerging type of inter-
connections that relaxes the geographical constraints of ASes and also facilitates interconnections
at a lower cost. Then we introduce Cooperative IP Transit (CIPT) and Transit for Peering (T4P),
two novel interconnection arrangements that reduce traffic delivery costs for the ASes. However,
some of the limitations are inherent to the current Internet architecture. To overcome those con-
straints, we present Route Bazaar, a new Internet architecture that, inspired by the use of the block
chain mechanism and cryptographic tools in cryptocurrencies, provides a contractual framework
for flexible interconnections with rich policies.
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Introduction
1
2 Introduction
Underlying the skyrocketing growth of the Internet, there is a complex and evolving ecosys-
tem where a multitude of interconnected networks or Autonomous Systems (ASes) support global
connectivity of end users. While social, cultural, and political factors are central to the Inter-
net [35], this thesis studies the economic aspects of the physical interconnection of the networks
that compose it. To achieve universal end-to-end connectivity, an interdomain protocol, Border
Gateway Protocol (BGP) [92], allows networks to route traffic through intermediary networks.
However, it is rather the economic relationships between ASes than the physical connectivity that
dictate routing in the Internet. As a consequence, actual routes frequently deviate from the short-
est paths making the physical topology of the Internet a weak guesstimate of how the Internet
actually works.
In routing traffic on behalf of other networks, ASes seek compensation for the use of their
resources. In the dynamic Internet ecosystem, ASes deal with potentially untrusted networks and
changing traffic patterns. To cope with this uncertain environment, ASes negotiate interconnec-
tion agreements to secure payments for the use of their infrastructure as well as service conditions
and compensations in case of infringement.
1.1 Background: Internet interconnections
Overcoming the limitations and bottlenecks of the evolving Internet interconnection ecosys-
tem requires understanding the economics of how networks interconnect and how traffic is routed
through them. Two types of interconnection agreements dominate the Internet landscape: Inter-
net Protocol (IP) [155] transit and peering. Only a handful of huge ASes can access the entire
Internet without paying anyone for the reachability. For the vast majority of the other ASes, the
universal connectivity comes at the price of IP transit, or simply transit. Transit is a bilateral
arrangement where the customer pays the provider for connectivity to the global Internet. Transit
providers typically charge customers for the peak of its traffic with prices decreasing in quantity.
Subadditive transit prices reflect the economies of scale present in traffic transport.
Transit costs are a significant part of the overall costs of ASes [60,74,105] because the decline
of transit prices per Mbps is accompanied by the fast growth of transit traffic [186]. The problem
of reducing the transit costs has attracted notable solutions including Internet eXchange Points
(IXPs) [15, 55, 58], IP multicast [18, 28, 54, 82, 83], Content Delivery Networkss (CDNs) [146],
Peer-to-Peer (P2P) localization [49], and traffic smoothing [63,101,114]. One property that these
proposals share is their objective to reduce the amount of traffic that traverses transit links. Intu-
itively, the less traffic of an AS flows through those links, the lower the cost is for the AS.
Settlement-free peering is a cost-effective alternative to transit. If two ASes exchange their
traffic via a transit provider, their payments to the provider significantly exceed the cost of com-
municating the same traffic over a settlement-free peering link. The costs of the peering are mostly
related to the infrastructure and labor of maintaining the physical interconnection, either as a di-
rect link or through an IXP. However the potential of settlement-free peering to reduce the costs
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for both peers does not mean that the ASes will indeed establish and sustain such a relationship.
For instance, the ASes might view each other as competitors and be unwilling to reduce the costs
of the counterpart. Furthermore, the costs of each party depend on the peering-link traffic and AS
sizes. Additionally, political or security related concerns could apply, for instance an AS might
prefer to avoid specific regions or networks that could compromise the integrity of the traffic.
The early commercial Internet was essentially a hierarchy where smaller ASes paid bigger
ASes for the universal Internet reachability via transit links. Subsequent massive emergence of
peering enabled many ASes to exchange their customer traffic over a more economical settlement-
free peering links [56, 78]. The evolution kept increasing the diversity of inter-AS connection
types and introduced partial-transit and paid-peering links [70,191]. In contrast to the full transit,
a partial-transit link offers access to only a fraction of the global Internet address space. With paid
peering, one of the peering ASes pays the other peer for exchanging their customer traffic.
In parallel to the interconnection evolution [57], the types of ASes have evolved as well. Some
ASes run eyeball networks that primarily serve residential users. Other ASes concentrate on pro-
viding Internet access for content providers such as Yahoo or YouTube [70, 125]. While popular
content providers are the major sources of Internet traffic, an eyeball network acts mostly as a
traffic sink. Peering between content and eyeball ASes has been problematic not only because
their traffic flows are unbalanced but also due to the heterogeneity of network types. The diffe-
rences between content and eyeball networks complicate the issue of whether and how much one
network should pay the other for their peering. Because the costs associated with last-mile in-
frastructures are typically high for the eyeball AS (and significantly higher than the infrastructure
costs of the content AS), the eyeball AS can view the high costs as a just cause for demand-
ing a compensation from the content AS. Moreover, since these high costs represent substantial
barriers to entry in the eyeball-network market, the eyeball AS can try leveraging its significant
market power when negotiating a peering agreement with the content AS [70, 125, 140]. On the
other hand, the content AS can be reluctant to compensate the eyeball AS and even perceive such
compensation demands as a violation of network neutrality [127]. The lack of clarity about proper
conditions for eyeball-content peering has led to so-called peering wars [10, 25, 26, 154] which
disrupted the Internet connectivity and ultimately lead to the net-neutrality debate [55].
While the Internet has proven to be extremely scalable, an ever growing traffic volume, in-
creasing demands for quality and performance, and recurrent conflicts over the economic settle-
ment of interconnections arrangements depict a challenging landscape for the future Internet. The
traffic growth is a long-term trend [47, 110], even though the main application fueling the growth
has been changing from web browsing [65] to P2P file sharing [181] to video streaming [152].
The growing popularity of delay-sensitive applications such as video streaming or Voice over
IP (VoIP), together with the growing use of the Internet to provide critical services such as online
banking or health services, puts additional pressure on the Internet structure.
4 Introduction
1.2 Contributions
This thesis dwells on the economic aspects of the ASes’ interconnections challenging the
future of the Internet and how to overcome them. In the context of unrelenting traffic growth and
with most networks dependent on transit providers to attain global Internet reachability, despite
falling transit prices, transit charges are a substantial fraction of the costs for most ASes.
Even though peering allowed networks to reduce their transit costs, peering requires ASes to
be physically colocated. As expanding the costly network infrastructure to colocate with other
ASes is only affordable for ASes with large volumes of traffic, the initial wave of pervasive peer-
ing was lead by large content providers such as Google. In contrast to the ubiquitous presence
of these large ASes, most networks had a narrower IXP presence restricted to their geographical
footprint. Chapter 2 presents the first empirical and analytical study on the emerging phenomenon
of remote peering, which enables ASes to overcome geographical barriers. Remote peering is an
interconnection where a remote network reaches and peers with other networks via an interme-
diary called a remote-peering provider. By buying a remote-peering service, networks can peer
without extending their own infrastructures to a shared location. Because remote peering is not
observable with the typical data used for the understanding of Internet topologies, remote peering
has been largely unnoticed by the academic community despite its wide adoption.
Chapter 3 proposes Cooperative IP Transit (CIPT), a multilateral cooperative interconnection
mechanism that helps ASes to deal with the financial burden of transit costs. CIPT reduces the
price of transit per Mbps: by jointly purchasing the IP transit, two or more ASes reduce the transit
prices per Mbps for each AS involved in the CIPT.
With the specialization of ASes into content providers and eyeball networks, different cost
structures and rising traffic imbalances have resulted in the net neutrality debate and sparked
recurrent conflicts over peering settlements. To alleviate these tensions, Chapter 4 proposes and
evaluates Transit for Peering (T4P), a hybrid bilateral AS relationship that continues the Internet
trend towards more flexible interconnections at lower costs. With a T4P interconnection, one
AS compensates the other AS for their peering by providing this other AS with a partial-transit
service. In comparison to paid peering, T4P is able to reduce the combined transit/peering costs of
an AS. By reducing traffic imbalances at a reduced cost, T4P has a potential to relax the ongoing
tensions between content and eyeball ASes.
While innovations such as CIPT, T4P, and remote peering make the interdomain ecosystem
more flexible, many limitations in the current Internet are inherent to its interconnection frame-
work. Without explicit means for direct coordination among multiple networks, suboptimal rout-
ing and routes oscillation is frequent, and reaction to traffic-demand changes and infrastructure
failures is problematic and slow. To ease these drawbacks, Chapter 5 departs from the current
Internet interconnection framework and proposes instead Route Bazaar, a new Internet architec-
ture inspired in the blockchain mechanism and cryptographic tools employed by cryptocurrencies
mechanisms. Finally, Chapter 6 discusses related work, Chapter 7 considers future research, and
Chapter 8 concludes this thesis.
Chapter 2
Remote Peering
5
6 Remote Peering
While the Internet economic structure is greatly important for security, reliability, and other
aspects of Internet design and operation, the structure remains poorly understood. Whereas
layer-2 protocols deals with linking two neighboring nodes, layer-3 protocols provide end-to-end
connectivity [107]. The Internet economic structure is typically modeled on layer 3 of Internet
protocols, partly because of the ability to infer economic relationships from BGP and IP measure-
ments.
In particular, BGP identifies ASes on announced paths, enabling inference of layer-3 struc-
tures where ASes act as economic entities interconnected by transit or peering relationships [76].
ASes are imperfect proxies of organizations, e.g., multiple ASes can be owned by a single organi-
zation and act as a single unit. Nevertheless, AS-level topologies [40,183] have proved themselves
useful for reasoning about Internet connectivity, routing, and traffic delivery. Despite the useful-
ness, layer-3 models struggle to detect and correctly classify a significant portion of relationships
in the dynamic economic structure.
Internet flattening refers to a validated evolutionary trend where major content providers ex-
pand their networks to directly connect with eyeball networks, that primarily serve residential
users, and thereby reduce the number of intermediaries on end-to-end paths [30, 56, 78]. Flatten-
ing opposes the hierarchical structure characterizing the early commercial Internet, where smaller
networks paid bigger ones for the universal reachability via transit links. The emergence of peer-
ing allowed networks to bypass transit providers, weakening the role of the latter in the Internet
structure.
The flattening trend is commonly conflated with a trend towards more peering. Indeed, direct
interconnections between content and eyeball networks are mostly peering relationships. Further-
more, cost reductions offered by peering serve as economic incentives for content providers to
expand their networks. The peering is typically done at IXPs [1,15,32]. These layer-2 infrastruc-
tures keep growing in the number of their members and amount of peering traffic.
This chapter presents the first empirical and analytical study on an emerging phenomenon of
remote peering that separates the trends of increasing peering and Internet flattening. Remote
Directly 
peering 
network
Remotely 
peering 
network
Remote-peering 
provider
IXP
Looking 
Glass 
server
Ping request
Layer-2 switch
IP router
Figure 2.1: Directly and remotely peering networks, and probing them from an LG server
7peering is an interconnection where a remote network reaches and peers with other networks via
a layer-2 intermediary called a remote-peering provider. By buying a remote-peering service,
networks can peer without extending their own infrastructures to a shared location. While remote
peering enables additional peering, the increase in peering does not flatten the economic structure.
Remote-peering providers include not only new companies, such as IX Reach [99] and Atrato IP
Networks [12], but also traditional transit providers that leverage their traffic-delivery expertise to
act as remote-peering intermediaries. Hence, remote peering means more peering without Internet
flattening.
This chapter reports two measurement studies and a mathematical model that generalizes
the empirical findings. First, we develop a ping-based method that conservatively estimates the
spread of remote peering. We apply the method in 22 IXPs worldwide and detect remote peers
in more than 90% of the studied IXPs, with remote peering by up to 20% of the members at an
IXP. Our second study evaluates how remote peering can affect traffic patterns. Based on ground
truth traffic in a research and education network, we estimate the amount of transit traffic that
this network might offload via remote peering at 65 IXPs. The results show significant offload
potential, around 25% of the traffic in some scenarios. While the measurements reveal dimin-
ishing marginal utility of remote peering at additional IXPs, we generalize this property in the
mathematical model and derive conditions for economic viability of remote peering.
By demonstrating the wide spread and significant traffic offload potential of remote peering,
our results challenge the research community’s reliance on layer-3 topologies in representing the
Internet economic structure. Because remote-peering providers are layer-2 entities, they are in-
visible on layer 3. Oblivious of the layer-2 intermediaries, layer-3 perspectives do not distinguish
between remote peering and direct peering. Thus, layer-3 models fail to expose that remote peer-
ing separates the trends of increasing peering and Internet flattening. Our findings identify a need
to reflect the presence of layer-2 entities in the Internet economic structure.
The wide spread of remote peering has broader implications for Internet research. The pres-
ence of intermediaries that are invisible on layer 3 adds to the security concerns as remote peering
introduces invisible intermediaries that could monitor traffic or deliver it through undesired ge-
ographies. For Internet accountability, it is a challenge to associate an action with the responsible
invisible entity. When a provider offers transit and remote peering, buying both might not yield
reliable multihoming. As a new economic option, remote peering opens a whole new ballgame
for connectivity, routing, and traffic distribution, e.g., via newly enabled IXPs [119]. To sum up,
this chapter makes the following main contributions:
• This chapter reports the first systematic study of remote peering. The work illumi-
nates the emerging phenomenon that many in the research community are unaware of. Even
those who already know about remote peering benefit from our quantification of its wide
spread and significant traffic offload potential.
• Our work reveals separation between the trends of increasing peering and Internet
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flattening. While remote-peering providers enable additional peering, they act as interme-
diaries in the Internet economic structure.
• The results call for a rethink of modeling the Internet economic structure as layer-
3 topologies. There is a need to reflect the increasing presence of layer-2 entities in the
Internet structure.
• The demonstrated prominence of remote peering has broader implications for secu-
rity, accountability, reliability, economics, and other aspects of Internet research.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.1 provides background on Internet
economic interconnections. Section 2.2 empirically studies the spread of remote peering. Sec-
tion 2.3 estimates a network’s potential to offload transit traffic to remote peering. Section 2.4
analyzes economic viability of remote peering versus transit and direct peering. Section 5.3 dis-
cusses broader implications of our findings. Finally, Section 2.6 sums up the chapter.
2.1 Interconnection landscape
We start by providing relevant background on economic relationships between networks in
the Internet.
2.1.1 Transit
Transit refers to a bilateral interconnection where the customer pays the provider for connec-
tivity to the global Internet. In a common setting, transit traffic is metered at 5-minute intervals
and billed on a monthly basis, with the charge computed by multiplying a per-Mbps price and
the 95th percentile of the 5-minute traffic rates [61, 180]. In the early commercial Internet, traffic
flowed mostly through a hierarchy of transit relationships, with a handful of tier-1 networks at the
top of the hierarchy.
2.1.2 Peering
Peering is an arrangement where two networks exchange traffic directly, rather than through a
transit provider, and thereby reduce their transit costs. The exchange is commonly limited to the
traffic belonging to the peering networks and their customer cones, i.e., their direct and indirect
transit customers. To reduce costs further, peering is typically done at IXPs.
Networks differ in their policies for recognizing another network as a potential peer. The
peering policies are typically classified as open, selective, and restrictive [122, 151]. An open
policy allows the network to peer with every network. A network with a selective policy peers
only if certain conditions are met. A restrictive policy has stringent terms that are difficult to
satisfy.
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Costs of peering and transit have different structures. Peering involves a number of traffic-
independent costs, e.g., IXP membership fees and equipment maintenance expenses at the IXP.
Peering also has traffic-dependent costs, e.g., IXP ports for higher traffic rates are more expen-
sive. Over the years, peering relationships have proven themselves as cost-effective alternatives
to transit.
Partly due to the lower costs, peering has spread widely, with the IXPs growing into major
hubs for Internet traffic. Peering relationships bypass layer-3 transit providers and thus make the
Internet flatter, at least on layer 3.
In this chapter, direct peering at an IXP refers to peering by a network that has IP presence in
the IXP location. If a network is not co-located with the IXP already, the network can establish its
IP presence at the IXP by contracting an IP transport service or extending its own IP infrastructure
to reach the IXP location.
2.1.3 Remote peering
Remote peering constitutes an emerging type of interconnection where an IP network reaches
and peers at a distant IXP via a layer-2 provider [24]. The remote-peering provider delivers traffic
between the layer-2 switching infrastructure of the IXP and remote interface of the customer. On
the customer’s behalf, the remote-peering provider also maintains networking equipment at the
IXP to enable the remote network to peer with other IXP members. Figure 2.1 depicts a typical
setting for the remote-peering relationship.
Remote peering provides a smaller connectivity scope than transit. Instead of global Internet
access, this service limits the connectivity to the reached IXP members and their customer cones.
Technologically, remote peering can be implemented with standard methods, such as those used
in layer-2 MPLS (MultiProtocol Label Switching) VPNs (Virtual Private Networks). The main
innovation of remote peering lies in its economics.
Remote peering has both traffic-dependent and traffic-independent costs. In comparison to
direct peering, the traffic-independent cost is lower, and the traffic-dependent cost is higher: the
remote-peering provider has multiple customers and reduces its per-unit costs due to traffic aggre-
gation and acquisition of IXP resources in bulk. Compared to transit, remote peering has lower
traffic-dependent costs. Thus, from the cost perspective, remote peering represents a trade-off
between direct peering and transit.
IXPs and remote peering are highly symbiotic. IXPs benefit from remote peering because
the latter brings extra traffic to IXPs, enriches geographical diversity of IXP memberships, and
strengthens the position of IXPs in the Internet economic structure. To promote remote peering,
AMS-IX (Amsterdam Internet Exchange), DE-CIX (German Commercial Internet Exchange),
LINX (London Internet Exchange), and many other IXPs establish partnership programs that
incentivize distant networks to peer remotely at the IXP. For example, some IXPs reduce mem-
bership fees for remotely peering networks. AMS-IX started its partnership program around year
2003. According to our personal communications with AMS-IX staff, about one fifth of the
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AMS-IX members were remote peers at the time of our study.
Implications of remote peering for transit providers are mixed. On the one hand, remote
peering gives transit customers alternative means for reaching distant networks. On the other
hand, remote peering is a new business niche where transit providers can leverage their traffic-
delivery expertise.
According to anecdotal evidence, remote peering successfully gains ground and satisfies di-
verse needs in the Internet ecosystem. In this chapter, we focus on usages where remote peering
at IXPs is purchased by distant networks or other IXPs. For example, AMS-IX Hong Kong and
AMS-IX interconnect their infrastructures via remote peering to create additional peering oppor-
tunities for their members [178]. We do not consider an alternative usage where remote peering at
an IXP is bought by a local network to benefit from cost reductions that remote peering provides
even over short distances [43].
2.2 Spread of remote peering
In this section, we report measurements that conservatively estimate the spread of remote
peering in the Internet.
2.2.1 Measurement methodology
Because remote peering is provided on layer 2, conventional layer-3 methods for Internet
topology inference are unsuitable for the detection of remote peering. For instance, traceroute
and BGP data do not reveal IP addresses or ASNs (AS Numbers) of remote-peering providers.
The basic idea of our methodology for detecting a remotely peering network at an IXP is to
measure propagation delay between the network and IXP. Specifically, we use the ping utility to
estimate the minimum RTT (Round-Trip Time) between the IXP location and the IP interface of
the network in the IXP subnet. If the minimum RTT estimate exceeds a threshold, we classify the
network as remotely peering at the IXP.
While our ping-based method is intuitive, the main challenges lie in its careful implementation
and include: identification of probed interfaces, selection of vantage points, adherence to straight
routes, sensitivity to traffic conditions, identification of networks, choice of IXPs, threshold for
remoteness, IXPs with multiple locations, impact of blackholing, and measurement overhead. We
discuss these challenges below.
Identification of probed interfaces: The targets of our ping probes are the IP interfaces of
the IXP members in the IXP subnet. IXP members do not typically announce the IP addresses
of these interfaces via BGP. To determine the IP addresses of the targeted interfaces, we look up
the addresses on the websites of PeeringDB [151], PCH (Packet Clearing House) [150], and IXP
itself.
Selection of vantage points: The ping requests need be launched into the IXP subnet from
within the IXP location so that the requests take the direct route from the IXP location to the
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probed interface. We send the ping requests from LG servers that PCH and RIPE NCC (Re´seaux
IP Europe´ens Network Coordination Centre) [164] maintain at IXP locations. Figure 2.1 depicts
our probing of IP network interfaces from an LG server at an IXP.
Adherence to straight routes: With our choice of the vantage points, the ping requests
and ping replies are expected to stay within the IXP subnet. It is important to keep the probe
routes straight because otherwise the RTT measurements might be high even for a directly peering
network. Potential dangers include an unexpected situation where the device of a probed IP
interface replies from one of its other IP interfaces and thereby sends the ping reply through
an indirect route with multiple IP hops. A more realistic danger is that some of our targeted
IP addresses are actually not in the IXP subnet because the respective website information is
incorrect. To protect our method from such dangers, we examine the TTL (Time To Live) field
in the received ping replies. When ping replies stay within the layer-2 subnet, their TTL values
stay at the maximum set by the replying interface [195]. When the path of a ping reply includes
an extra IP hop, the TTL value in the reply decreases. Therefore, we discard the ping replies with
different TTL values than an expected maximum. We refer to this discard rule as a TTL-match
filter. For the expected maximum TTL, our experiments accept two typical values of 64 and
255 hops. Although ping software might set the maximum TTL to other values (e.g., 32 or 128
hops), these alternative settings are relatively infrequent, and ignoring them does not significantly
increase the number of discarded ping replies in our experiments. Also, different ping replies from
the same interface might arrive with different TTL values, e.g., because the replying interface
changes its maximum TTL. Whereas we are interested in a conservative estimate for the extent of
remote peering, we discard all replies from an IP interface if their TTL value changes during the
measurement period. We call this rule a TTL-switch filter.
Sensitivity to traffic conditions: Even if a probe stays within the IXP subnet, RTT might
be high due to congestion. To deal with transient congestion, we repeat the measurements at
different times of the day and different days of the week for each probed IP interface, and record
the minimum RTT observed for the interface during the measurement period. This minimum RTT
serves as a basis for deciding whether the interface is remote. Again to be on the conservative
side, we exclude an IP interface from further consideration if we do not get at least 8 TTL-
accepted ping replies from this interface for each probing Looking Glass (LG) server. We call
this rule a sample-size filter. The limit of 8 replies and other parameter values in our study are
empirically chosen to obtain reliable results while keeping the measurement overhead low. If less
than 4 of the collected ping replies have RTT values within the maximum of 5 ms and 10% of
the minimum RTT, i.e., below RTTmin + max{5 ms, 0.1 · RTTmin}, we apply an RTT-consistent
filter to disregard the interface. For an IXP that has both PCH and RIPE NCC servers, we probe
each IP interface from both LG servers and exclude the interface from further consideration if the
larger of the two respective minimum RTTs is not within the maximum of 5 ms and 10% of the
smaller one. We refer to this rule as an LG-consistent filter.
Identification of networks: To identify the network that owns a probed IP interface, we
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IXP
IXP name
Location Peak Number Number of
acronym City Country
traffic of analyzed
(Tbps) members interfaces
AMS-IX Amsterdam Internet Exchange Amsterdam Netherlands 5.48 638 665
DE-CIX German Commercial Internet Exchange Frankfurt Germany 3.21 463 535
LINX London Internet Exchange London UK 2.60 497 521
HKIX Hong Kong Internet Exchange Hong Kong China 0.48 213 278
NYIIX New York International Internet Exchange New York USA 0.46 132 239
MSK-IX Moscow Internet eXchange Moscow Russia 1.32 367 218
PLIX Polish Internet Exchange Warsaw Poland 0.63 235 207
France-IX France-IX Paris France 0.23 230 201
PTT PTTMetro Sa˜o Paolo Sa˜o Paolo Brazil 0.30 482 180
SIX Seattle Internet Exchange Seattle USA 0.53 177 175
LoNAP London Network Access Point London UK 0.10 142 166
JPIX Japan Internet Exchange Tokyo Japan 0.43 131 163
TorIX Toronto Internet Exchange Toronto Canada 0.28 177 161
VIX Vienna Internet Exchange Vienna Austria 0.19 121 134
MIX Milan Internet Exchange Milan Italy 0.16 133 131
TOP-IX Torino Piemonte Internet Exchange Turin Italy 0.05 80 91
Netnod Netnod Internet Exchange Stockholm Sweden 1.34 89 71
KINX Korea Internet Neutral Exchange Seoul South Korea 0.15 46 71
CABASE Argentine Chamber of Internet Buenos Aires Argentina 0.02 101 68
INEX Internet Neutral Exchange Dublin Ireland 0.13 63 66
DIX-IE Distributed Internet Exchange in Edo Tokyo Japan N/A 36 56
TIE Telx Internet Exchange New York USA 0.02 149 54
Table 2.1: Properties of the 22 IXPs in our measurement study on the spread of remote peering
use the network’s ASN. We map the IP addresses to ASNs through a combination of looking up
PeeringDB, using the IXPs’ websites and LG servers, and issuing reverse DNS (Domain Name
System) queries. If the ASN of an IP interface changes during the measurement period, we
exclude the IP interface from further consideration. This exclusion rule is called an ASN-change
filter.
Choice of IXPs: In choosing IXPs, we strive for a global scope surpassing the regional
focuses of prior IXP studies. Our choice is constrained to those IXPs that have at least one
LG server. Under the above constraints, we select and experiment at 22 IXPs in the following
4 continents: Asia, Europe, North America, and South America. After manually crawling the
websites of the IXPs in January 2014, we collect data on their location, peak traffic, and number
of members. Table 2.1 sums up these data. While information at IXP websites is often incomplete,
out of date, or inconsistent in presenting a property (e.g., peak traffic), our measurement method
does not rely on these data. We report this information just to give the reader a rough idea about
the geography and size of the studied IXPs. For each studied IXP, Table 2.1 also includes the
number of analyzed interfaces, i.e., interfaces that stay in our analyzed dataset after applying
all 6 aforementioned filters. Across all the 22 IXPs, we apply the filters in the following order:
sample-size, TTL-switch, TTL-match, RTT-consistent, LG-consistent, and ASN-change. After
the filters discard 20, 82, 20, 100, 28, and 5 interfaces respectively, we have a total of 4,451
analyzed interfaces. The high count of TTL-switch discards is likely due to operating system
changes during our measurements.
2.2 Spread of remote peering 13
10−3 10−2 10−1 100 101 102 103
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
RTTs (ms)
Fr
ac
tio
n 
of
 R
TT
s
Figure 2.2: Empirical CDF of the analyzed interfaces according to their minimum RTTs
Threshold for remoteness: We classify a network as remotely peering at an IXP if the mini-
mum RTT observed for its IP interface at the IXP exceeds a threshold. Despite the redundancy of
our RTT measurements, the minimum RTT might still include non-propagation delays, e.g., due
to persistent congestion of the IXP subnet or probe processing in the network devices. To mini-
mize the possibility that such extra delays trigger an erroneous classification of a directly peering
network as remote, the threshold should be sufficiently high. Figure 2.2 plots the cumulative di-
stribution of the minimum RTTs for all the 4,451 analyzed interfaces. A majority of the analyzed
interfaces have minimum RTTs distributed almost uniformly between 0.3 and 2 ms. This is a
pattern expected for directly peering networks. The likelihood of a network being a direct peer
declines as the minimum RTT increases. Our manual checks do not detect any directly peering
network with the minimum RTT exceeding 10 ms. Thus, we set the remoteness threshold in our
study to 10 ms. While this relatively high threshold value comes with a failure to recognize some
remotely peering networks as remote peers, the false negatives do not constitute a significant con-
cern because we mostly strive to avoid false positives in estimating the spread of remote peering
conservatively.
IXPs with multiple locations: If an IXP operates interconnected switches in multiple loca-
tions, probes from an LG server at one location to an IP interface at another location might have a
large RTT. The chosen remoteness threshold of 10 ms is sufficiently high to avoid false positives
in cases where all locations of the IXP are in the same metropolitan area. False positives are possi-
ble if the geographic footprint of the IXP is significantly larger, e.g., spans multiple countries. We
do not observe such situations in our experiments. In a more common scenario, two partner IXPs
from different regions, e.g., AMS-IX Hong Kong and AMS-IX, interconnect by buying layer-2
connectivity from a third party. Our methodology correctly classifies such scenarios as remote
14 Remote Peering
peering.
Impact of blackholing: If a probed interface intentionally blackholes or accidentally fails to
respond to ping requests, the IP interface might be excluded from our analyzed data due to a low
number of ping replies for the interface, as discussed above. In a hypothetical (not observed in
our experiments) scenario where the probed interface forwards the probe to another machine that
sends a ping reply on the interface’s behalf, the ping reply is discarded by our TTL-match filter
and does not affect accuracy of our RTT measurements.
Measurement overhead: While our method relies on probing from public LG servers, it
is important to keep the measurement overhead low. The probes are launched through HTML
(HyperText Markup Language) queries to the servers. The LG servers belonging to RIPE NCC
and PCH react to an HTML query by issuing respectively 3 and 5 ping requests. For any LG
server, we submit at most one HTML query per minute and generally spread the measurements
over 4 months. The maximum number of ping replies received from any probed IP interface is 21
and 54 for respectively RIPE NCC and PCH servers.
We conducted the measurements during the 4 months from October 2013 to January 2014.
2.2.2 Experimental results
Figure 2.3 classifies all 4,451 analyzed interfaces across the 22 IXPs according to the min-
imum RTT measured for each interface. Despite using the high value of 10 ms for the remote-
ness criterion, the classification does not reveal remote interfaces in only two IXPs (DIX-IE and
CABASE), i.e., our conservative estimate finds remote peering in 91% of the studied IXPs. While
the numbers of remote interfaces are large in the 3 biggest IXPs (AMS-IX, DE-CIX, and LINX),
these numbers are also large at smaller IXPs such as France-IX in France, PTT in Brazil, JPIX in
Japan, and TOP-IX in Italy. Hence, our method independently confirms wide presence of remote
peering in the Internet economic structure.
The classification in Figure 2.3 looks at the remote interfaces in greater detail by considering
the following 3 ranges for the minimum RTT: [10 ms; 20 ms), [20 ms; 50 ms), and [50 ms; ∞)
which roughly correspond to intercity, intercountry, and intercontinental distances. We detect the
intercontinental-range peering at 12 IXPs, i.e., a majority of the studied IXPs. For example, Italian
network E4A remotely peers at both TIE and TorIX, based in the USA and Canada respectively.
Brazilian networks comprise most of the remote peers at PTT, the largest among the 21 IXPs of
the PTTMetro project in Brazil. The high fraction of remote interfaces at the Turin-based TOP-
IX likely results from the IXP’s interconnections with VSIX and LyonIX, two other Southern
European IXPs located in Padua and Lyon respectively.
Switching the perspective from the interfaces to the networks that own them, we apply our
network identification method (described in Section 2.2.1) to determine ASNs for 3,242 out of the
4,451 analyzed interfaces. While a network might have interfaces at multiple IXPs, we identify a
total of 1,904 networks. We refer to the number of the studied IXPs where a network peers as an
IXP count of the network. Figure 2.4a presents the distribution of the IXP counts for all the 1,904
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Figure 2.3: Classification of the analyzed interfaces according to their minimum RTTs
identified networks. While a majority of the networks connect to only one IXP, some networks
peer at as many as eighteen IXPs.
285 of the identified networks have a remote interface at a studied IXP. Business services
offered by the remotely peering networks are diverse and include transit (e.g., Tu¨rk Telecom),
access (e.g., E4A and Invitel), and hosting (e.g., Trunk Networks). Figure 2.4a also plots the
distribution of the IXP counts for all the 285 remotely peering networks. Both distributions in
Figure 2.4a are qualitatively similar, suggesting that the choice of IXPs for a network to peer is
relatively independent of whether the network peers directly or remotely.
We also examine the remotely peering networks with respect to the minimum RTTs of their
analyzed interfaces. For each IXP count, we consider all the analyzed interfaces of the remotely
peering networks with this IXP count and separate the interfaces into the following 4 categories
according to their minimum RTT: [0 ms; 10 ms), [10 ms; 20 ms), [20 ms; 50 ms), and [50 ms;
∞). Figure 2.4b depicts the fractions of these 4 categories. By definition, the remote peering
networks with the IXP count of 1 have no interfaces with the minimum RTT below 10 ms. As the
IXP count increases, the fraction of the remote interfaces tends to decline because some interfaces
of the remotely peering networks are used for direct peering. E4A exemplifies networks with a
large number of remote interfaces: 6 of its 9 analyzed interfaces are classified as remote.
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Figure 2.4: IXP-count distributions and interface classifications for identified networks
2.2.3 Method validation
While our methodology employs a series of filters and high remoteness threshold to avoid
false positives, this section reports how we validate the method and its conservative estimates of
remote peering.
First, we use ground truth at TorIX, an IXP located in Toronto. TorIX staff confirmed that
their members classified as remotely peering networks in our study are indeed remote peers. In
one case, the TorIX staff initially thought that a network identified as a remote peer by our method
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was rather a local member with a direct peering connection. Nevertheless, a closer examination
showed that throughout our measurement period this local member conducted maintenance of its
Toronto PoP (Point of Presence) and connected to TorIX from its remote PoP via a contracted
layer-2 facility.
Then, we take a network-centric perspective, focus on the E4A and Invitel networks, and
validate our classifications of their interfaces as remote. Based on the measurements, our method
classifies the E4A interfaces at DE-CIX, France-IX, LoNAP, TorIX, and TlE as remote. We
confirm that E4A indeed peers remotely at these 6 IXPs through private conversations as well as
IXPs public information [6, 123]. Our method identifies Invitel as a remote peer at AMS-IX and
DE-CIX, with RTTs of 22 and 18 ms respectively. Our private inquiries indicate that Invitel uses
remote-peering services of Atrato IP Networks to reach and peer at AMS-IX and DE-CIX.
Finally, we receive an independent confirmation that our RTT measurement methodology is
accurate. On our request, the TorIX staff measured minimum RTTs between the TorIX route
server and member interfaces. Their results for our analyzed interfaces closely match our RTT
measurements from the local PCH LG server. The mean and variance of the differences are
respectively 0.3 and 1.6 ms.
2.3 Traffic offload potential
While Section 2.2 demonstrates that remote peering is widespread, we now evaluate how
much transit traffic a network can offload to remote peering. Based on ground truth traffic, we
estimate the traffic offload potential and study its sensitivity to peering policies.
2.3.1 Traffic data
The main basis for our estimation effort is traffic in RedIRIS, the NREN (National Research
and Education Network) in Spain. RedIRIS is connected to GE´ANT (backbone for European
NRENs), buys transit from two tier-1 providers, peers with major CDNs (Content Delivery Net-
works), and has memberships at two IXPs: CATNIX in Barcelona and ESpanix in Madrid. In
February 2013, we used NetFlow to collect one month of traffic data at the 5-minute granularity
in the ASBRs (Autonomous System Border Routers) of RedIRIS.
Our interest is limited to the traffic flows on the transit-provider links of RedIRIS. We classify
each such flow as inbound traffic or outbound traffic depending on whether RedIRIS respectively
receives the flow from its transit providers or sends the flow to them. The collected dataset
identifies networks by their ASNs and contains records for 29,570 networks that are origins of the
inbound traffic or destinations of the outbound traffic.
Utilizing the BGP routing tables in the ASBRs, we determine the AS-level path and traffic
rate for each of the traffic flows. While a network can be associated with a traffic flow in the
role of a traffic origin, destination, or intermediary, we classify the traffic flows associated with
18 Remote Peering
    1  5000 10000 15000 20000 25000
101
103
105
107
109
Network rank
In
bo
un
d 
tra
ffi
c 
(bp
s)
 
 
RedIRIS transit
Offload potential (all policies)
    1  5000 10000 15000 20000 25000
101
103
105
107
109
Network rank
O
ut
bo
un
d 
tra
ffi
c 
(bp
s)
 
 
RedIRIS transit
Offload potential (all policies)
(a) Network contributions to the transit traffic and offload potential
0 2000 4000 6000 8000
0
5
10
Time (5−minute interval)
In
bo
un
d 
tra
ffi
c 
(G
bp
s)
 
 
RedIRIS transit
Offload potential (all policies)
0 2000 4000 6000 8000
0
2
4
6
Time (5−minute interval)
O
ut
bo
un
d 
tra
ffi
c 
(G
bp
s)
 
 
RedIRIS transit
Offload potential (all policies)
(b) Time series of the transit traffic and offload potential over the measurement period
Figure 2.5: Contributions by networks to the RedIRIS transit traffic and offload potential in sce-
nario 4
a network as its origin traffic (originated in the network), destination traffic (terminated in the
network), and transient traffic (passing through the network).
To illustrate the contributions of the 29,570 networks to RedIRIS’ transit-provider traffic, we
examine how much traffic each individual network contributes as an origin of the inbound traffic
and destination of the outbound traffic. Figure 2.5a plots the average traffic rates for the respective
inbound and outbound contributions by the individual networks during the measurement period.
The figure ranks the networks in the decreasing order of the contributions. While a few networks
make huge contributions close to the Gbps mark, most networks contribute little. In the range
where the networks are ranked about 20,000 and contribute average traffic rates around 100 bps,
the distributions of the inbound and outbound traffic exhibit a similar change in the qualitative
profile of the decreasing individual contributions, a bend toward a faster decline. Whereas the raw
data exhibit the bend as well, an explanation of the bend is an interesting question for future work.
Figure 2.5b reveals daily and weekly fluctuations in RedIRIS’ transit-provider traffic, which are
especially clear for the inbound traffic.
2.3.2 Offload scenarios
RedIRIS cannot offload all of its transit-provider traffic. The offload potential depends on
the set of IXPs that the network is able to reach via remote peering. Also, the memberships of
the reached IXPs do not include all the networks that contribute to the transit-provider traffic of
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RedIRIS. Finally, not all the members of the reached IXPs are likely to peer with RedIRIS.
For the set of IXPs that RedIRIS might be able to reach, we consider the Euro-IX association
formed, as of February 2013, by 65 IXPs from all the continents [67]. The considered 65 IXPs
are a superset of the 22 IXPs studied in Section 2.2, with the set enlargement made feasible by
removing the constraint of having LG servers in the IXPs. Based on Euro-IX data from February
2013, we limit potential peers of RedIRIS to the members of these 65 IXPs.
We further trim the group of potential peers by excluding the networks that are highly unlikely
to peer with RedIRIS. First, we do not consider the transit providers of RedIRIS as its potential
peers because transit providers typically do not peer with their customers. It is worth noting
that no network sells transit to these two tier-1 providers, and thus no such network needs to be
excluded due to its transitive transit relation with RedIRIS. Second, since RedIRIS already has
memberships in CATNIX and ESpanix, the other members of these two IXPs are disregarded as
candidates for remote peering with RedIRIS. In particular, we exclude all the other tier-1 networks
because they have memberships in ESpanix. Third, due to the cost-effective interconnectivity
that comes with the GE´ANT membership, we do not consider the other GE´ANT members as
potential peers of RedIRIS. After applying the above three rules, the group of potential remote
peers of RedIRIS reduces to 2,192 networks. Even after eliminating the highly unlikely peers,
there remains a significant uncertainty as to which of the 2,192 networks might actually peer with
RedIRIS.
To deal with the remaining uncertainty about potential peers, we examine a range of peer
groups, i.e., groups of networks that might peer with RedIRIS. Using PeeringDB which reports
peering policies of IXP members [122, 151], we compose the following 4 peer groups so that the
peering policies of their members comprise:
[peer group 1] all open policies;
[peer group 2] all open and top 10 selective policies,
which adds to peer group 1 the 10 networks that have the largest offload potentials among
the networks with selective policies;
[peer group 3] all open and selective policies;
[peer group 4] all policies, i.e., all open, selective, and restrictive policies.
Peer group 4 constitutes our upper bound on the likely peers of RedIRIS. When RedIRIS
reaches all the 65 IXPs, this peer group 4 includes all the aforementioned 2,192 networks. Peer
group 1 represents a lower bound on the networks that might actually peer with RedIRIS. It is
common for such open-policy networks to automatically peer with any interested IXP member
via the IXP route server [165].
For each peer group, we determine the offload potential of RedIRIS by fully shifting to remote
peering the traffic that the networks of this peer group and their customer cones contribute to the
transit-provider traffic of RedIRIS. While RedIRIS is in control of its outbound transit traffic, we
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assume that the networks of the peer group shift the inbound transit traffic of RedIRIS to remote
peering as well.
In addition to studying sensitivity of the offload potential to the peer groups, we also evaluate
its sensitivity to the choice of reached IXPs. Specifically, our evaluation varies the set of reached
IXPs from a single IXP to all the 65 IXPs in the Euro-IX data.
2.3.3 Evaluating the offload potential
This section looks at the networks that contribute to RedIRIS’ transit-provider traffic (as ori-
gins of the inbound traffic or destinations of the outbound traffic) and are able to shift their traffic
contributions to the remote-peering links between RedIRIS and its potential peers. In scenario
4 (all policies), there are 12,238 such networks, including the 2,192 potential peers of RedIRIS.
Separately for the inbound and outbound directions of the transit-provider traffic, Figure 2.5a
plots the average offload potential for each of the 12,238 contributing networks, ranking them
in the decreasing order of the traffic contributions. Remote peering enables RedIRIS to offload
around 27% and 33% of its total inbound and outbound traffic respectively. While the inbound
traffic dominates the outbound traffic during the data collection period, Figure 2.5b also shows
that the peaks of the transit traffic and offload potential consistently coincide, implying that the
offloading can indeed reduce the transit bill which is typically determined by the traffic peak.
Figure 2.6 zooms in on the top 30 potential peers with the largest contributions of the com-
bined inbound and outbound offload traffic, where the contributions include origin, destination,
and transient traffic. The top 30 contributors include Microsoft, Yahoo, and CDNs, suggesting
that content-eyeball traffic greatly contributes to the offload potential. For a majority of the top
contributors, the origin and destination traffic dominates the transient traffic.
Limiting the offload to only one IXP, we now examine the offload potential in each of the
4 scenarios. Figure 2.7 plots the results for the top 10 IXPs under this constraint, with the top
10 ranking according to the full offload potential at an IXP. The top 4 of the IXPs include the
big European trio (AMS-IX, LINX, and DE-CIX) and Terremark from Miami, USA. In either
of the 4 scenarios, the offload potentials at the large European IXPs remain close to each other
because these IXPs have a lot of common members. On the other hand, the peering policies make
a very different impact on the offload potential at Terremark. Terremark’s numerous members
from South and Central America [162] contribute significantly to the RedIRIS transit traffic but
do not have their own presence in Europe.
To evaluate the utility of traffic offload at an additional IXP, we consider a situation where
RedIRIS already realizes its full offload potential at one IXP and decides to peer remotely at an-
other IXP. If the two IXPs have common members that contribute to the RedIRIS transit-provider
traffic, the full realization of the offload potential at the first IXP reduces the amount of traffic
that RedIRIS can offload at the second IXP. For scenario 4 (all peering policies), Figure 2.8 il-
lustrates this effect when AMS-IX, LINX, DE-CIX, and Terremark act as either the first or the
second IXP. When LINX and AMS-IX act as the first and second IXPs respectively, the offload
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Figure 2.6: Origin and destination traffic vs. transient traffic for top contributors to the offload
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Figure 2.8: Full offload potential at an IXP and marginal utility of traffic offload at an additional
IXP
potential remaining at AMS-IX is 0.2 Gbps, which is much lower than the 1.6-Gbps full potential
at AMS-IX. When Terremark acts as the second IXP, the decrease in its offload potential is less
pronounced because Terremark shares only about 50 of its 267 members with either of the three
largest European IXPs.
Generalizing the above, we determine marginal utility of remote peering at multiple extra
IXPs by expanding the peering reach of RedIRIS by one IXP at a time. The expansion is in the
decreasing order of the offload potential remaining at an IXP. For example, the expansion order in
scenario 4 is AMS-IX, Terremark, DE-CIX, CoreSite, . . . For all the 4 scenarios, Figure 2.9 plots
the remaining transit traffic of RedIRIS as a function of the IXPs where RedIRIS peers remotely.
The overall reduction in transit traffic varies from 8% in scenario 1 (all open policies) to 25% in
scenario 4 (all policies). Figure 2.9 shows that the marginal utility of peering at additional IXPs
diminishes exponentially and that peering at a few IXPs enables RedIRIS to realize most of its
total offload potential.
While the previous results are specific to RedIRIS, we now switch the metric from traffic to
the number of reachable IP interfaces and present empirical results suggesting that the property of
diminishing marginal utility of reaching an additional IXP holds in general. Like in the RedIRIS
experiments, we expand a set of IXPs one at a time. The expansion is in the decreasing order of
the number of additional IP interfaces reachable through an IXP. Figure 2.10 plots the number of
IP interfaces reachable only through transit providers as the IXP set expands. With no IXPs in
this set, i.e., without any peering at all, around 2.6 billion IP interfaces are reachable through the
transit hierarchy. When the set includes the first IXP in scenario 4 (all policies), about 1 billion
IP interfaces remain reachable only through transit providers. The marginal utility of including
additional IXPs consistently declines in all 4 scenarios. Note that this perspective of reachable IP
interfaces does not depend on the particulars of RedIRIS or another network. Even though the
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additional IXPs
declining profiles in figures 2.9 and 2.10 are quantitatively different, their qualitative similarity
indicates that diminishing marginal utility of reaching one more IXP is a general property.
2.4 Economic viability
While Section 2.3 showed significant traffic offload potential and diminishing marginal utility
of remote peering at additional IXPs, we now generalize the empirical results in the mathematical
model and derive conditions for economic viability of remote peering versus transit and direct
peering.
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2.4.1 Model
In our model, a network delivers its global traffic via 3 options: (1) transit, (2) expansion of its
own infrastructure for direct peering at n IXPs, and (3) remote peering at m IXPs. The respective
traffic fractions are denoted as t, d, and r:
t+ d+ r = 1. (2.1)
Total cost C of the traffic delivery consists of transit, direct-peering, and remote-peering compo-
nents Ct, Cd, and Cr:
C = Ct + Cd + Cr. (2.2)
While Section 2.3.3 shows diminishing marginal utility of reaching one more IXP, we fit the
RedIRIS data to exponential decay and model the transit traffic fraction as the following function
of the number of IXPs where the network peers either directly or remotely:
t = e−b·(n+m). (2.3)
Equation 2.3 generalizes our empirical results via parameter b that controls how quickly the
transit traffic fraction declines. While b = 0 represents networks that cannot reduce its transit
traffic by peering at distant IXPs, b =∞ enables offload of all transit traffic by reaching a single
IXP. Low values of b are characteristic for networks with mostly global traffic, e.g., Google and
other networks with highly distributed traffic. The results in Figure 2.4a suggest that networks
with high b values are more common. With parameter p denoting the normalized transit price, we
model the transit cost as
Ct = p · t = p · e−b·(n+m). (2.4)
The direct-peering cost depends on both the number of the reached IXPs and traffic delivered
through them:
Cd = g · n+ u · d. (2.5)
While parameter g accounts for membership fees and other traffic-independent costs of the net-
work in the distant IXPs, parameter u reflects traffic-dependent costs.
The remote-peering cost has a similar structure with traffic-independent and traffic-dependent
parts:
Cr = h ·m+ v · r. (2.6)
The per-IXP traffic-independent cost for remote peering is typically lower than for direct
peering:
h < g, (2.7)
and the per-unit traffic-dependent cost for remote peering is larger than for direct peering but
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smaller than for transit:
u < v < p. (2.8)
Combining equalities 2.2, 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6, we express the total traffic-delivery cost of the
network as
C = p · e−b·(n+m) + g · n+ u · d+ h ·m+ v · r. (2.9)
2.4.2 Analysis
Seeking to minimize its total cost, the network might first consider only transit and direct
peering at distant IXPs without purchase of remote peering, i.e., m = 0 and r = 0. Under this
strategy, the total cost is
C = (p− u) · e−b·n + u+ g · n, (2.10)
and the network minimizes the cost by reaching n˜ IXPs to offload traffic fraction d˜ via direct
peering:
n˜ =
log
(
b·(p−u)
g
)
b
and d˜ = 1− e−b·n˜. (2.11)
Continuing from the above solution, the network might widen its strategy to include remote
peering, with the total cost becoming
C = (p− v) · e−b·(n˜+m)
+ (v − u) · e−b·n˜ + g · n˜+ u+ h ·m. (2.12)
The network minimizes the cost in equality 2.12 by remote peering at m˜ extra IXPs:
m˜ =
log
(
g·(p−v)
h·(p−u)
)
b
, (2.13)
Inequality m˜ ≥ 1 means that remote peering at one or more IXPs reduces the total cost. Thus,
we establish the following condition for economical viability of remote peering:
g · (p− v)
h · (p− u) ≥ e
b. (2.14)
Our analysis shows that remote peering is more viable economically for networks with lower
b values, i.e., networks carrying global traffic. Networks carrying big volumes of traffic such as
Google or other large content providers do have an incentive to be present in many IXPs. However
the large volumes of traffic carried justify the costs of their physical presence at multiple IXPs.
Large content providers have previously underpinned the observed trend towards a flatter Internet.
Differently, remote peering enables smaller networks with global traffic to benefit from peering
even if the smaller volumes of traffic do not justify the costs of physical peering. Remote peering
gives such networks a cost-effective alternative to the costly expansion of their own network
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infrastructures and alters the trend towards a flatter Internet by introducing an intermediary in
peering. For instance, networks such as Invitel, E4A or LinkedIn carry geographically distributed
but not the volumes of traffic that would justify physical peering at a large number of IXPs.
Instead, these networks rely on remote peering providers to extend its presence. For instance E4A
peers at 9 IXPs, at 6 of them remotely.
The economical viability condition contains g/h, i.e., the ratio of the per-IXP traffic-
independent costs for direct and remote peering. In regions such as Africa, h tends to be much
smaller than g because local IXPs offer little opportunities to offload traffic, and transit is expen-
sive [69, 87]. Thus, our analytical model explains why remote peering is economically attractive
for African networks.
2.5 Discussion
The emergence of remote peering exposes that increasing peering and Internet flattening are
separate trends. The two trends are typically conflated because the expansion of content-network
infrastructures bypasses transit providers through physical peering reducing the number of inter-
mediaries in their connections. Complementing direct peering, remote peering enables additional
peering as well. However, this increase in peering involves a remote-peering provider that acts
a middleman. Furthermore, the intermediary that sells the remote-peering service can be a tra-
ditional transit provider. Hence, remote peering increases peering without flattening the Internet
economic structure.
The observed separation of the two trends questions the usage of AS-level topologies for
representing the Internet economic structure. With remote-peering services provided on layer 2,
layer-3 models of the Internet structure omit the remote-peering providers and fail to distinguish
remote peering from direct peering and hence ignore the presence of remote peering provider in-
termediaries. Below, we elaborate on various dangers posed by this omission of the intermediary
economic entities.
While it is common to use AS-level models for reasoning about Internet security, the hidden
presence of layer-2 intermediaries undermines security assurances. The invisible intermediaries
might be unwanted entities, e.g., those associated with problematic governments. The risks in-
clude monitoring or alteration of traffic by the intermediaries and exposure of traffic to other
parties, e.g., by delivering it through undesired geographies.
The reliance on layer-3 models also compromises accountability. Whereas a layer-2 interme-
diary might delay or discard traffic, attribution of responsibility for such performance disruptions
is complicated because the middleman is invisible on layer 3.
Layer-3 topologies can make the Internet structure look more reliable than it is. When a com-
pany employs the same physical infrastructure to provide transit and remote-peering services,
buying both might not translate the redundancy into higher reliability for the multihomed cus-
tomers.
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Because remote peering has different economics than transit and direct peering, the omission
of the layer-2 intermediaries from layer-3 models weakens the economic understanding of the In-
ternet. In developing markets such as Africa, remote peering becomes a cost-effective alternative
for reaching well-connected areas in Europe and North America [87]. Since remote peering has
a smaller connectivity scope than transit, adoption of remote peering necessitates new strategies
for traffic distribution. IXPs greatly benefit from remote peering: existing IXPs gain members,
and new IXPs are enabled by bringing together a critical mass of traffic [119]. Ignoring the
remote-peering providers distorts substantially the Internet economic landscape.
Thus, our results call for alternative models of the Internet structure that explicitly represent
layer-2 entities. The relevant additions include not only remote-peering providers but also other
layer-2 economic entities such as IXPs. With the growing prominence of IXPs and remote-peering
connectivity to them, integrated modeling of the Internet structure on layers 2 and 3 becomes
increasingly important for understanding the Internet.
The refined mapping of the Internet economic structure on layers 2 and 3 will likely require
novel methods for inference of economic entities and their relationships. These methodological
innovations constitute an interesting direction for future work.
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter presented the first empirical and analytical study on remote peering. Using care-
ful measurements of RTTs at 22 IXPs worldwide, our ping-based method exposed wide spread of
remote peering, with remote peering in more than 90% of the examined IXPs and peering on the
intercontinental scale in a majority of them. Based on real traffic in RedIRIS, we also estimated
how much transit traffic the network can offload via remote peering at 65 IXPs. The assessment
showed significant traffic offload potential, around 25% in some cases, and exhibited diminishing
marginal utility of remote peering at additional IXPs. After generalizing this property in the math-
ematical model, we derived conditions for economic viability of remote peering versus transit and
direct peering.
While important in itself as an emerging factor in the Internet ecosystem, remote peering was
showed to have broader implications for Internet research. Remote peering revealed separation
between the trends of increasing peering and Internet flattening which had been commonly con-
flated. With remote peering provided on layer 2, the omission of remote-peering providers from
traditional layer-3 representations of the Internet topology compromises research on Internet se-
curity, accountability, reliability, and economics. We called for refined modeling of the Internet
economic structure on both layers 2 and 3.
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Cooperative IP Transit (CIPT)
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The previous chapter showed how the rapidly evolving Internet ecosystem generates new
types of interconnections, such as remote peering, to cope with new needs and challenges. Con-
tinuing this trend toward greater diversity of Internet interconnections, this chapter proposes a
novel arrangement that address the problem of high transit costs.
The Internet ecosystem involves thousands of ASes linked in a more or less hierarchical man-
ner to support universal connectivity of Internet users. While a small number of ASes can reach
the entire Internet without paying any other network for the reachability, the immense majority of
ASes need to pay transit providers to attain global reachability.
In spite of the steady decline of IP transit prices, the IP transit costs remain high due to
the traffic growth. Over the previous decades a number of solutions have been suggested to
reduce these IP transit costs by reducing the volume of billed transit traffic. Proposed solutions
reduce the transit traffic volume and include settlement-free [30, 56, 78] or paid peering [58],
IXPs [15, 55], IP multicast [18, 28, 54, 82, 83], CDNs [146], P2P localization [49] and traffic
smoothing [63, 101, 114].
This chapter proposes CIPT (Cooperative IP Transit), a different approach to reducing the
cost of IP transit. Instead of altering the traffic that flows through the transit links, CIPT reduces
the price of transit per Mbps: by jointly purchasing the IP transit, two or more ASes reduce the
transit prices per Mbps for each AS involved in the CIPT.
Tuangou1 (group buying) has been highly successful in other domains [117]. While tuangou
succeeds primarily due to subadditivity of prices [37, 38, 186], the benefits of CIPT depend also
on burstable billing [61], different methods to account for bidirectional traffic, and other complex
factors.
To illustrate the CIPT concept, Figure 3.1 plots real traffic profiles of three ASes. If the
ASes form a CIPT and purchase transit jointly, the total cost is smaller than when purchasing
it separately because: (a) Transit billing is burstable, i.e., the buyer is billed for the peak of its
traffic; because the peaks of the traffic of the ASes are not completely coincident, the peak of
the combined traffic is smaller than the sum of the separate peaks; (b) Transit prices are subaddi-
tive, i.e., prices per Mbps decrease as the purchased amount increases. Consequently, the traffic
aggregation enables CIPT to reduce costs of its partners.
The novelty of CIPT in the Internet ecosystem lies in the cooperative essence of the arrange-
ment. While CIPT reduces costs by transit traffic aggregation, the latter is common in the Inter-
net. Most transit providers are transit resellers that profit from lower rates resulting from transit
aggregation. As early as in 1990s, The Little Garden (TLG) [187] pooled traffic of small cus-
tomers together to obtain cheaper transit rates. Government-promoted IXPs also lower transit
costs through national transit traffic aggregation, e.g., in Bahrain [16, 161] and other developing
countries [4, 5]. CIPT is substantially different from previous transit-aggregation schemes in the
following aspects:
1 Tuangou (pronounced ”twangoo”), a term originating in China, loosely translates as group buying,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tuangou.
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Figure 3.1: Demand statistics for partners P1 (top), P2 (middle), and P3 (bottom) in the motivating
example: the x-axes are in hours; the y-axes are in Mbps; the filled (green) areas depict the
upstream traffic; the (blue) lines represent the downstream traffic.
• Cooperation of transit buyers;
• Mechanisms for distribution of the benefits of transit aggregation.
Beyond the new application of tuangou in the domain of IP transit, a major contribution of
this chapter lies in its measurement and evaluation methods. Relying on real inter-domain traffic
and transit pricing, this chapter estimates the gains from CIPT. We also propose Shapley value
as a basis for sharing the gains among the CIPT partners so that to provide each partner with a
strong economic incentive for the cooperation. Our evaluation of the aggregate and individual
gains involves collection of the visual traffic statistics from 6 public IXPs with 264 participating
ASes, transformation of the visual images into a numeric format, and public-data validation of
the property that peering and transit traffic have similar temporal profiles. Our analysis suggests
that the expected relative savings of CIPT are in the range of 8-56% for the IXP-wide coalitions;
in absolute terms, each of the partners may expect annualized savings from one thousand US$
for very small ASes to several hundred thousand US$ for the few large ASes. We also show that
much smaller coalitions, with a half a dozen of members, can offer close-to-maximum savings.
The main contributions of this chapter are as follows:
• We propose CIPT, a simple cooperative strategy to reduce costs by purchasing IP
32 Cooperative IP Transit (CIPT)
transit jointly.
• We show that CIPT can be modeled as a cooperative game and that Shapley value
provides an intuitive mechanism for cost sharing in CIPT.
• We use public IXP data to infer the traffic time series for several hundred (mostly
regional and national) ASes and use this information to assess the potential cost benefits of
CIPT.
While our results on the CIPT cost reduction validate the potential of CIPT to become a new
viable element of the Internet ecosystem, the practical viability of CIPT also depends on other
strategic and organizational issues. For example, if two ASes are already engaged in a transit
relationship, they are unlikely to agree on buying IP transit jointly from a third party. Also, the
transit provider can strategically respond to CIPT by charging the coalition at higher prices per
Mbps than the prices offered to an individual AS. On the other hand, big transit providers might
strategically accept CIPT to squeeze out smaller transit providers. By aggregating transit traffic,
CIPT might become an attractive customer for large transit providers bypassing transit resellers.
It is quite possible that CIPT will not grow into the dominant mechanism for IP transit cost
reduction. On the other hand, earlier success in cost reduction via transit aggregation [4,5,16,187]
suggest that CIPT is certainly feasible and can gain a broad presence in the Internet ecosystem,
from small websites in a hosting facility to the level of nation-wide ASes. Data-driven assessment
of all these additional issues lies beyond the scope of this thesis. Similarly, while we propose
Shapley value as a means for cost sharing in CIPT, evaluation of alternative solutions to CIPT
cost sharing is a topic for future work.
3.1 Background and motivation
The geographic location affects significantly the cost of IP transit [135]. The IP transit prices
perMbps per month range usually from $5 to $100 (we use $, US$ or USD to refer to U.S. dollars
throughout the rest of this thesis): the wholesale IP transit is typically priced under $10 perMbps
in most European and North American hubs but can exceed $100 per Mbps in Australia, Latin
America and other remote regions of the Internet [5, 186].
Regardless of the geographic location, IP transit is subject to economies of scale and is priced
subadditively: the prices per Mbps are smaller for larger quantities of IP transit [186]. Table 3.1
presents real (as of January 2011) transit pricing rates of Voxel, a middle-size transit provider in
North America. The table reports the prices for different levels of Committed Data Rate (CDR),
the minimum amount charged by the provider. For example, an AS with IP transit needs of
300 Mbps commits at the 100-Mbps CDR level and pays pro rata $3000 to the transit provider,
but an AS with IP transit needs of 700 Mbps finds it more cost-effective to commit at the 1000-
Mbps CDR level and pays $5000.
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Committed Data Rate, Mbps Price per Mbps per month
10 $25
50 $15
100 $10
1000 $5
10000 $4
Table 3.1: IP transit pricing rates
Burstable billing is another important aspect of IP transit pricing [61, 134]. To calculate
the IP transit cost, the most commonly used method is to calculate the peak usage (typically
through the 95th-percentile rule [61,134]) and then the price function f is applied to the observed
peak to calculate the resulting payment. The peak value is usually calculated separately for the
upstream and downstream directions, and either sum or maximum of the two is used for billing.
We refer to these two pricing models as sum and max models. Intuitively, the max model offers a
larger opportunity for savings in cooperation because two ASes with their traffic peaks in opposite
directions can mutually benefit from the less utilized directions of each other. Consequently,
results for the sum model can be considered as a conservative estimate of CIPT gains (Figure 3.6
in Section 3.4.1.2) confirms this intuition).
To illustrate the potential of CIPT, we consider a simple scenario of three partners2 P1, P2,
and P3 interested in purchasing IP transit from the same provider. We assume the transit pricing
rates as in Table 3.1, 95th-percentile burstable billing, sum model of accounting for bidirectional
traffic, and traffic profiles plotted in Figure 3.1.
If the three partners purchase the IP transit separately, the individual traffic peaks (computed
as the sum of the peaks in both directions) of P1, P2, and P3 are at 379 Mbps, 130 Mbps, and
362 Mbps respectively, and each of the partners commits at the 100-Mbps CDR level. Thus,
partners P1, P2, and P3 pay respectively $3790, $1300, and $3620 with the aggregate transit cost
of $8710.
On the other hand, if P1, P2 and P3 use CIPT to buy the IP transit together, their aggregate
peak traffic is 712 Mbps. By committing at the 1000-Mbps CDR level, the CIPT pays $5000.
Thus, the cooperation reduces the aggregate transit cost of the partners by $3710, or 43%. This
significant cost reduction comes from two different sources:
1. Burstable billing – the 712-Mbps peak of the aggregate traffic is lower than the 871-Mbps
sum of the individual traffic peaks; hence, the aggregate transit cost would decrease even if
the pricing function were additive;
2. Subadditive pricing – the upgrade from the 100-Mbps CDR level to the 1000-Mbps one
provides a lower price perMbps and thereby reduces the aggregate transit cost even further.
2We interchangeably use terms partner and player to refer to any AS, hosting provider or any other entity interested
in purchasing IP transit.
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3.2 Cooperative IP transit
While we have already sketched the main idea of the CIPT, this section provides more details,
describes the concept of cooperative (or coalitional) games, and models CIPT as a cooperative
game.
Cooperative IP Transit (CIPT) refers to any cooperative mechanism in which two or more
subjects purchase the IP transit jointly as a means for cost reduction. The subject interested in
CIPT can be any Internet entity that buys IP transit; such entities include websites and hosting
providers, as well as access, nonprofit, and content ASes.
The main incentive for forming a CIPT coalition is financial: each partner reduces its individ-
ual IP transit bill. The typical IP transit pricing makes it virtually impossible for a set of potential
partners to increase their aggregate transit cost by buying the IP transit jointly. However, CIPT
needs a reasonable mechanism to distribute the aggregate cost savings among all the CIPT part-
ners. Furthermore, the aggregate and individual IP transit costs of the CIPT partners strongly
depend on a number of factors such as the IP transit pricing function, number of partners, their
size, and temporal patterns of their traffic demands.
3.2.1 CIPT as a cooperative game
Formally, a cooperative game is characterized by setN of involved players and a cost function
that maps the partitive3 set of N to a cost value: c : 2N → R. In the context of CIPT, set N is
the set of subjects interested in purchasing IP transit. The cost function maps an arbitrary subset
S ⊂ N to the cost of the IP transit that the coalition of players from S would pay. An important
property of the IP transit model is that the price per Mbps is a non-increasing function of the
peak, due to the subadditive nature of the pricing model.
CIPT is formed by a set of N partners. Each partner i of the CIPT has upstream and down-
stream IP transit traffic demands represented respectively by time series ui(t) and di(t) where
i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}, and time t is measured in fixed-size time intervals with a typical interval dura-
tion of 5 minutes. The cost that subject i pays for the transit, without participation in CIPT, is the
function of these demand series:
Ci = F (ui(·), di(·)).
After bundling of N subjects, the aggregate upstream/downstream demands are the sum of the
corresponding individual demands:
u(t) =
N∑
i=1
ui(t) and d(t) =
N∑
i=1
di(t),
3For set N , the partitive set of N is the set of all subsets of N and is usually denoted as 2N .
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and the aggregate cost of the IP transit is
C = F (u(·), d(·)).
The 95th-percentiles of the upstream (peak(up)) and downstream (peak(down)) traffic are cal-
culated, and the peak value used for billing is either the sum or max of these two values, as
described in Section 3.1. The transit cost of the coalition of these N players is then
C = F (u(·), d(·)) = f(peak)
where f is the pricing function decided by the IP transit provider. This pricing function is typically
subadditive, Table 3.1 provides an example of such pricing function.
Additionally, for virtually any real-world subjects interested in purchasing IP transit, the peak
traffic of the union of two subjects is smaller than the sum of the peaks of these two subjects.
In case of measuring the peak as the maximal traffic, this is an obvious consequence of the fact
that the maximum of the sum of two nonnegative functions (over the same domain) is not greater
than the sum of the maximums of these two functions. If the peak is measured through the 95th-
percentile method, there may be some irregular cases4 in which the sum of the 95th-percentiles is
smaller than the 95th-percentile of the union of the traffic of the two subjects. Nevertheless, these
situations are extremely unlikely to happen in regular setups. We demonstrate this in Figure 3.2 by
plotting the cumulative distribution for the ratio of the 95th-percentile of the union to the sum of
the 95th-percentiles across all the pairs of ASes at Budapest Internet Exchange (BIX) in both sum
and max models. BIX and several other IXPs publish traffic statistics that each of their members
(mostly regional ASes) exchanges at the IXP, and this information represents valuable and useful
proxy for estimating the traffic patterns (volume, peak-hour, peak-to-valley ratio, up/downstream
traffic ratio, etc.) for the involved ASes.
Observation 1. The traffic patterns of subjects interested in CIPT are such that for (almost)
all pairs of coalitions S1 and S2 of these subjects, the peak value of the union of the two coalitions
is smaller than the sum of the peak values of these two coalitions.
As we elaborate above, Observation 1 is intuitive and can be empirically validated for avail-
able data of traffic patterns. From now on, we assume that subjects involved in CIPT are such that
this observation is true. In that case, cost function c(·) is indeed subadditive:
c(S1) + c(S2) ≥ c(S1 ∪ S2), for any S1, S2 ⊂ N . (3.1)
Hereby, virtually always the overall IP transit cost of CIPT is strictly smaller than the sum of
4For example, two subjects consuming 100 Mbps 4% of the time each, one in the morning the other over night,
and using 1 Mbps the remaining 96% of the time will have their 95th-percentile equal to 1 Mbps, while their union
would have 95th-percentile equal to 100 Mbps.
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Figure 3.2: The distributions for the ratio of the 95th-percentile of the union to the sum of the
95th-percentiles across all the pairs of ASes at Budapest Internet Exchange
individual IP transit costs of all involved players:
ρ =
C∑N
i=1Ci
< 1.
The relative savings (1 − ρ) of the CIPT are influenced by several factors, with the two domi-
nant being: (1) the subadditivity of the price function and (2) burstable billing through the 95th-
percentile method. Namely, the subadditive pricing leads to savings for the involved players be-
cause prices (per Mbps) are lower for larger quantities. Additionally, with the burstable billing,
when two or more players have non-overlapping peak hours, their coalition would have the peak
value strictly smaller than the sum of the peak values of the involved players. While players that
serve similar user bases have similar temporal usage patterns (e.g., residential networks peak in
evening hours, government/academic networks peak in early afternoon), the networks of differ-
ent types experience their peaks in times that are far apart, which in turns allows for additional
savings in top of bundling and buying-in-bulk.
3.3 Cost sharing in CIPT
A key question in any cooperation scheme created for cost reduction reasons is how to split
the aggregate costs of cooperation. As we saw in Section 3.2.1, CIPT can be abstracted as a
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cooperative game which puts us in a position to use the rich set of analytic tools for solving the
problem of cost sharing. There are many solution concepts for cost sharing in cooperative games,
including the core, kernel, nucleolus, and Shapley value [199]. While other solution concepts
have attractive features, in the context of CIPT we find particularly appealing to use the Shapley
value since it has several distinct important properties, i.e., the Shapley value: (1) exists for any
cooperative game and is uniquely determined, (2) satisfies basic fairness postulates [173, 199],
and (3) is individually rational, i.e., each player in CIPT receives a lower Shapley value cost
than what it would be if it did not participate in CIPT. One potential deficiency of the Shapley
value is that in general it is computationally hard to calculate it exactly. However, state-of-the-art
techniques provide simple and accurate methods for Shapley value approximation, as discussed
in Section 3.3.2.
3.3.1 Shapley value: definition
For a cooperative game defined over set N of N players and each subset (coalition) S ⊂ N ,
let c(S) be the cost of coalition S. Thus, if coalition S of players agrees to cooperate, then c(S)
determines the total cost for this coalition.
For given cooperative game (N , c(·)), the Shapley value is a (unique) vector
(φ1(c), . . . , φN (c)) defined below, for sharing the cost c(N ) that exhibits the coalition of all
players. It is a “fair” cost allocation in that it satisfies four intuitive properties: efficiency, sym-
metry, additivity and null-player; see [173,199] for exact definitions of these properties and more
details. The Shapley value of player i is precisely equal to i’s expected marginal contribution if
the players join the coalition one at a time, in a uniformly random order. Formally it is determined
by:
φi(c) =
1
N !
∑
pi∈SN
(c(S(pi, i))− c(S(pi, i) \ i)) (3.2)
where the sum is taken across all permutations (or arrival orders), pi, of set N and S(pi, i) is the
set of players arrived in the system not later than i. In other words, player i is responsible for its
marginal contribution c(S(pi, i)) − c(S(pi, i) \ i) averaged across all N ! arrival orders pi. Note
that the Shapley value defined by Equation 3.2 indeed satisfies the efficiency property:∑
i∈N
φi(c) = c(N ).
3.3.2 Estimation of the Shapley value in CIPT
While the Shapley value can be computed in a rather straightforward manner using Equa-
tion 3.2, it is not practically feasible to employ Equation 3.2 for N > 30. A number of methods
have been suggested for accurate estimation of the Shapley value, and in this chapter we use a
simple Monte Carlo method [118] as follows.
Instead of calculating the exact Shapley value as the average cost contribution across all N !
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arrival orders, we estimate the Shapley value as the average cost contribution over set Πk of K
randomly sampled arrival orders:
φˆi(c) =
1
K
∑
pi∈ΠK
(c(S(pi, i))− c(S(pi, i) \ i)) (3.3)
Parameter K determines the error between the real Shapley value and its estimate: the higher
K the lower the error. So basically, one can control the accuracy of the estimator by increasing
the number of sample permutation orders. We observe in our datasets of traffic demands that the
value of K = 1000 provides errors of under 1% across all the CIPT players, and in the rest of this
chapter we use K = 1000 for the computation of the Shapley value.
3.4 Evaluation
In this section we quantify various factors that impact CIPT by using traffic information from
264 (mainly national and regional) ASes. In Section 3.4.1, we describe the dataset and pricing
model(s). In Section 3.4.2, we evaluate the potential savings of CIPT on country-wide (IXP-wide)
collaborations and show that significant savings could be expected both in relative and absolute
terms. In Section 3.4.3, we augment this analysis by empirically showing that even small single-
digit coalitions can yield close-to-optimal savings, by demonstrating a law of diminishing returns
for the savings as a function of the coalition size. Section 3.4.4 analyzes the per-player savings
and shows somewhat expectable trends that the larger the player is, the larger are its absolute
savings, but the smaller its relative savings are. Finally, in Section 3.4.5, we analyze the effects of
collaboration between geo-diverse players and present an analytical upper bound on the savings
as a function of the time difference in their peak-hour periods.
3.4.1 Dataset description
Although data for the traffic patterns of many ASes is often kept confidential, some public
IXPs report upstream and downstream demand time series for the traffic exchanged by every
member of the IXPs. Those that do it are listed in Table 3.2. This traffic statistics data is typically
given in the form of mrtg images [188], similar to those shown in Figure 3.1. Overall we collected
the information for 264 ASes, with the traffic peak distribution as shown in Figure 3.3. While
the information about the traffic exchanged at the public IXPs is obviously a valuable piece of
information, it is not straightforward how to use this information to estimate the transit usage of
the ASes. In Section 3.4.1.2, we use a small set of ASes that make their detailed traffic information
public, to show that the IXP related traffic is a good proxy for estimating the transit part of the
interdomain traffic, at least for some ASes. Before that, we elaborate on the data collection below.
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Figure 3.3: The distribution of the peak traffic rates across all 264 ASes: median: 560 Mbps;
mean: 2.9 Gbps
IXP members peak average 95th-pct effect subadditive effect
skewness
acronym (# of) (Gbps) (Gbps) sum max sum max
NIX 54 116 76 4.3% 29.1% 95.7% 70.9% 0.76
SIX 52 42 23 15.4% 44.9% 84.6% 55.1% 0.27
IIX 17 2.1 1.38 14.3% 40.6% 85.7% 59.4% 0
FICIX 25 32 19 6.7% 23.1% 93.3% 76.9% 0.48
InterLAN 63 22 11 14.3% 37.8% 85.7% 62.2% 0.12
BIX 53 152 92 3.6% 27.8% 96.4% 72.2% 0.84
Table 3.2: Basic stats on the used IXPs
3.4.1.1 Dataset collection
We started by manually inspecting the webpages of medium-size and large IXPs at [67]. A
majority of these IXPs publish their aggregate traffic statistics, summed across all the members,
but some also make public the detailed traffic statistics of their members. We identified several
IXPs that do so. Table 3.2 lists them. We then crawled the websites of these IXPs and collected
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per-member traffic information. This per-member traffic data is typically given in the form of
visual images, similar to those in Figure 3.1, produced as the outputs of the standard tools for
traffic visualization: mrtg/rrdtool [188]. To convert the information into a numeric form, we
built a piece of software that takes as input a mrtg/rrdtool image and outputs the numeric array
representing the upstream/downstream traffic time series. This operation of transforming the .png
images to numeric data required serious effort in the domain of optical character and function
recognition.
3.4.1.2 From IXP data to IP transit traffic
Most ASes consider the data of their networks as confidential and are reluctant to share it
with third parties. However, some ASes publicly share large amounts of operational information.
In particular, several European ASes serving academic institutions have publicly shared on their
websites detailed pictures of both their network infrastructure and utilization of their networks.
Those that we identified are HEANET (Ireland) [95], SANET (Slovak Republic) [168], CESNET
(Czech Republic) [39], GRNET (Greece) [86]. We inspected the peering and transit traffic for
those four ASes and found that the peering traffic pattern is a good first-order indicator of the
transit traffic. In those 4 ASes, peering corresponds to 35-40% of the total traffic, with the re-
maining 60-65% being transit. Additionally, we observe that peering and transit traffic follow
very similar temporal patterns: their growth and decay periods coincide, they peak at the same
time, have similar peak-to-valley ratios, etc. In some sense, such behavior is not very surpris-
ing: given that the demand is predominantly created by humans, both transit and peering traffic
demand are driven by the same end-user activities.
AS sim(Tup, Pup) sim(Tdown, Pdown)
HEANET 0.988 0.965
SANET 0.996 0.991
Table 3.3: The cosine-similarity between the transit (T) and peering (P) time series (both down-
stream and upstream directions)
The empirical evidence of two academic ASes that publish their network load information,
HEANET and SANET, suggest that γ belongs to [1.5, 2] for medium-size European countries
with one dominant IXP. In Figure 3.4, we depict the peering and transit traffic for both ASes on
Thursday, 13th January 2011. One can observe that the peering and transit traffic profiles are
rather similar. To quantify the similarity of the demand patterns, we use the cosine-similarity
between the corresponding demand time series: X = (x1, . . . , xT ) and Y = (y1, . . . , yT ):
sim(X,Y ) =
∑T
i=1XiYi√∑T
i=1X
2
i
√∑T
i=1 Y
2
i
.
The value of sim(X,Y ) is equal to the cosine of the angle between the vectors X and Y in
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Figure 3.4: The transit and peering traffic in two national ASes: HEANET and SANET
the T -dimensional Euclidian space. Thus sim(X,Y ) = 1 if X = αY for a scalar α; other-
wise sim(X,Y ) < 1. Table 3.3 reports the values of cosine-similarity for the upstream and
downstream time series for the both ASes.
Consequently in our analysis, we approximate the transit traffic of ASes (belonging to cor-
responding IXPs) with their peering traffic (information that is publicly available) multiplied by
a factor γ that determines the relative weight of the transit vs. peering traffic. In Section 3.4.2,
we describe expectable savings of CIPT for γ ∈ [0.5, 4]. However, in Sections 3.4.3 through
3.4.5 (which analyze the cost-sharing, coalition size, and geo-diversity), we fix γ at 1.5, which
corresponds to the transit/peering traffic ratio of 60/40 suggested by our empirical analysis for
medium-size European countries with a single dominant IXP (the case of our 6 IXPs).
While this approximation is rather crude, it nevertheless captures the main features of the
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AS: relative size, peak-hour period, upstream-to-downstream ratio, etc. For example, γ = 0.5
corresponds to the case where the peering traffic amounts to 1/(1 + γ) = 2/3 of all the traffic
of the AS (as in Japan [47] and other localized markets), while γ = 4 corresponds to the case
where 1/(1 + γ) = 20% of the total AS traffic is exchanged at the IXP, and the remaining 80% is
transferred through transit (this situation is common in small markets [5]).
3.4.1.3 Pricing model
In the following evaluation, we use the pricing model (described in Section 3.1) with prices
given in Table 3.1 and upstream/downstream traffic billed with either sum or max model. In
Section 3.4.2, we describe the results of a comparative study of both sum and max models. In
Sections 3.4.3 through 3.4.5, we focus on the sum pricing model (the more conservative one in
terms of cost reduction) for the analysis of cost sharing, coalition size and geo-diversity.
3.4.2 Aggregate savings
In this section, we evaluate the aggregate potential savings of the IP transit costs for the
coalitions consisting of all members within each IXP listed in Table 3.2. Following the discussion
in Section 3.4.1.2, we approximate the IP transit traffic patterns by the traffic exchanged at these
IXPs multiplied by constant γ ∈ [0.5, 4]; this constant represents the ratio between the transit and
peering traffic volumes.
We stress again that the purpose of this evaluation is to shed some light on the potential savings
of CIPT rather than computing accurate bounds of the savings. Such exact saving estimates
strongly depend on various factors and should be calculated on a case-by-case basis.
For each of the 6 studied IXPs, Figure 3.5 reports the expected savings on the IP transit bill,
both relative and absolute, in both the sum and max models. We see that the relative savings are
in the range of 5-70% depending on the relative size of the IXPs and several other factors. These
relative savings are strongly impacted by the size distribution of the involved ASes. Namely,
for those IXPs that have several large ASes that dominate the traffic (and the costs), the relative
savings of CIPT are low because these large ASes already receive the lowest price per Mbps. To
illustrate that this is indeed the case, we define the skewness factor as the fraction of the traffic
generated by the players with the peak traffic greater than 10 Gbps. Table 3.2 shows that the
expected relative savings are considerably higher for the IXPs with a low skewness of under 0.3
(SIX, IIX, and InterLAN).
Remember that the savings of CIPT come from two properties of the IP transit model: price
subadditivity and 95th-percentile billing. To quantify the effects that these two properties have
on the CIPT savings, we identified what the relative savings would be without the subadditivity
of the prices, i.e., if the price per Mbps would be constant independent of the usage level. Such
savings would come exclusively from the reduction in the 95th-percentile, the rest of the savings
would hence correspond to the subadditivity effect. Table 3.2 presents these results in columns
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Figure 3.5: The absolute and relative savings as a function of the ratio between the transit and
IXP traffic volumes
95th-pct effect and subadditive effect respectively. From this table, we can conclude that both
properties (price subadditivity and 95th-percentile billing) influence the total savings.
The decreasing trend of relative savings can be observed in both sum and max pricing mod-
els. The decrease happens because the players with large volumes have smaller opportunities for
large relative savings by CIPT (as they already experience a low price per Mbps). Nevertheless,
the relative savings are bounded from below by the quantity of the 95th-pct effect reported in
Table 3.2 for both sum and max pricing models. Figure 3.6 replots the above findings to directly
demonstrate that the sum model is indeed more conservative than the max model with respect to
the attained CIPT gains.
We conclude this analysis with an observation that the 6 (medium-size European) countries
hosting these IXPs have such traffic locality that around 40% of the traffic stays inside the country
and is exchanged by peering (mainly through the dominant IXP), while the remaining 60% of the
traffic uses IP transit. This corresponds to value γ of 1.5. Using this value of γ, we conclude that
the expected relative savings in IP transit costs for the IXP-wide CIPT coalitions are in the range
of 8-35% (in the sum model) and 32-56% (in the max model).
While we rely on the pricing function of a middle-size transit provider, the pricing function of
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Figure 3.6: Differences in CIPT savings with the max vs. sum models
a larger provider can yield further quantity discounts: if a transit provider attracts large customers,
the provider can offer discounts on larger volumes than alternative smaller transit providers, i.e.,
there are greater economies of scale with a large transit provider than with a smaller one.
On the other hand, regardless of how large the transit provider is, the additional discounts
are finite. Therefore, starting from some huge traffic volume, CIPT cannot benefit from further
discounts. At such traffic volumes, CIPT gains arise due to the 95th-percentile effect rather than
the subadditive effect.
3.4.3 Coalition size
In the previous section, we analyzed the potential savings of coalitions that include all mem-
bers of the corresponding IXPs. While such coalitions offer significant savings in terms of IP
transit costs, coordination of such large coalitions may be cumbersome. In this section, we show
that much smaller coalitions can offer savings comparable to those of the large coalitions. We take
the Slovak Internet eXchange (SIX) with N = 52 members, and for each k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N} we
analyze the per-player savings from participating in the coalition of k random members of SIX.
The pricing model is sum, and γ is set to 1.5. The results for other IXPs, max pricing model and
other choices of γ are qualitatively similar; hence, we omit them for brevity.
In Figure 3.9, we report the median, 5th-percentile, and 95th-percentile savings, relative to
the savings obtainable from the grand coalition of all N = 52 members. Since analyzing the
statistics across all 252 subsets is infeasible, we report the results obtained by sampling: for
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each member i and each coalition size k, we pick random 100 subsets of size k that contain
member i. From Figure 3.9 we can observe the law of diminishing returns: relatively small
coalitions provide savings very close to the savings of the large coalitions, and, by adding more
members to the coalition, the incremental savings are decreasing. In particular, even with as few
as k = 3 members, one can expect savings that are half as large as the savings obtainable by the
coalition of all N = 52 members. With k ≥ 10 members, the median CIPT savings are greater
than 80% of the savings obtainable by the grand coalition.
Note that the savings grow as the coalitions become larger. This is the consequence of the
basic property of the CIPT cooperative game: the cost function is subadditive, as seen in Inequal-
ity 3.1. In other words, by adding a member, the coalition is better off. Also, note that for some
ASes, participating in some smaller coalitions may be more beneficial than participating in the
grand coalition (the relative savings exceed 1).
We stress that the results of this section are for random coalitions. By careful cherry-picking
the most appropriate partners, one can obtain even higher savings, as the 95th-percentile of the
savings in Figure 3.9 suggests. However, such optimization is out of scope for the present thesis.
3.4.4 Per-partner savings
In this section, we look at the per-member savings for each of the involved ASes when it par-
ticipates in the IXP-wide CIPT. Following the reasoning described in Section 3.4.1.2, the γ factor
used for scaling of the transit traffic is set to 1.5, and the pricing model is the more conservative
sum model. As we elaborate in Section 3.3, each member of the coalition is assigned a cost
equal to its Shapley value. The CIPT costs (across all ASes) are depicted in Figure 3.7 against
the original IP transit annual costs. Figure 3.8 shows the absolute annual savings (the difference
between the original IP transit costs and CIPT costs) for all ASes in these 6 IXPs.
We can observe two trends in Figures 3.7 and 3.8. First, the absolute savings typically grow
with the size of the AS. This is a consequence of the fact that having a large AS in a coalition
typically implies lower per Mbps costs which in turn increases the contribution of the AS to
the coalition, as reflected by the computation of the Shapley value in Equation 3.2. Therefore,
a large AS can benefit from joining a coalition because the gains are computed as a total and
then redistributed using the Shapley value, even if such large AS does not obtain a further price
discount, other ASes do generate gains of which the large AS benefits.
In contrast to this increasing trend of the absolute savings, there is another interesting property
of the CIPT cost allocation. Namely, the relative savings of CIPT (the ratio of the absolute
savings of CIPT to the original IP transit costs) typically see a decreasing trend as a function
of the AS size. This feature (decreasing trend of the relative savings) is strongly connected with
the nature of the Shapley value as a cost allocation strategy but arises also because peak time
of the aggregate traffic is predominantly determined by the large ASes. This means that ASes
joining already larger coalitions (those that reached a close-to-minimum price per Mbps) bring
lower relative benefits to the coalitions, consequently implying low relative-gains for these ASes.
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Figure 3.7: The original annual costs versus CIPT costs (Shapley value) across all the ASes from
the 6 IXPs
While the Shapley value computes the expected contribution of an AS regardless of when it joins
the coalition, absolute gains growth exhibits a decreasing trend. Consequently, relative gains
decrease as the AS size grows.
3.4.5 Cooperation between remote subjects
So far, our analysis was concerned with the ASes operating in the same geographic area, and
consequently having close peak hours. In such scenarios, the savings are mainly impacted by the
price subadditivity rather than the burstable billing. In this section, we investigate potential sav-
ings of collaboration between geographically distant players. Because the remote collaboration
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Figure 3.8: The absolute annual savings for all the ASes from the 6 IXPs
involves IP transport costs, it is possible only for large players. Only then the long-distance trans-
port becomes cheap enough to make the CIPT economically viable [186]. Such long-distance
transport to major (cheap) Internet hubs is not uncommon method for AS cost optimization. For
example, each of the four largest IXPs – German Commercial Internet Exchange (DE-CIX), Ams-
terdam Internet Exchange (AMS-IX), London Internet Exchange (LINX), New York International
Internet Exchange (NYIIX) – host ASes from more than 40 different countries.
Additionally, cooperation between very remote subjects (say, more than 6 time zones), may
strongly impact the performance in terms of increased propagation delays. Some delay-sensitive
applications (voice, gaming, etc.) may find such increase in delay unacceptable. Therefore, CIPT
between very remote subjects is reasonable only for the traffic that is not delay sensitive (content,
P2P, etc.) which indeed represents the majority of the Internet traffic [101, 114, 134].
While identifying and separating delay-tolerant traffic from non-delay-tolerant traffic is not
trivial, the respective technical challenges have already been addressed [114, 134]. Even though
48 Cooperative IP Transit (CIPT)
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
k − random coalition size
re
la
tiv
e 
sa
vi
ng
s
 
 
median
5th−percentile
95th−percentile
Figure 3.9: Relative (as fraction of the savings obtained in the grand coalition) per-player savings
for smaller coalitions
traffic separation might be viewed as a network-neutrality violation, it might be also regarded as
acceptable for performance reasons [53]. Since our goal is to show the economic attractiveness of
CIPT, we focus on potential gains from CIPT between remote subjects, rather than on its technical
implementation or net-neutrality aspects.
To analyze the potential savings in such a setup, we look at the potential savings of col-
laborations with two partners. Once all the partners are large enough to receive the minimum
per-Mbps price, the coalitions with more than two partners are not bringing large marginal ben-
efits in terms of price reduction. Thus, we here focus on 2-partner coalitions. To assess the
potential savings in such cases, we take all M = 93 ASes from our 6 IXPs with the peak
traffic greater than 1 Gbps and shift each of them for a (uniformly) random number of time
zones. For each of the M(M − 1)/2 pairs, we evaluate the relative savings of the coalition:
1−cost(CIPT (i, j))/(cost(i)+cost(j)) and plot them against the time difference in Figure 3.10.
One can observe the following trend: the further away the two partners are, the greater the oppor-
tunity is for the CIPT savings. In Figure 3.10, we also depict the bound
g(ψ) =
1− | cos ψ2 |
2
, (3.4)
where ψ = time−difference24 2pi is the scaled time difference. We prove the upper bound on the
relative savings in a simple model where the demand curves are modeled as sin-waves (see below).
One can observe that the relative reduction in the 95th-percentile for a coalition of two partners is
in the range of [0, 0.5], in line with the model predictions. However, the expected savings appear
to be larger as the time difference grows, and peak when two ASes are 12 time zones apart. To
explain and quantify this property, we employ a simple trigonometric model where the demand
pattern of the AS is modeled as a sin-wave function. The following proposition characterizes
the expected reduction in the peak traffic from CIPT collaboration between two partners with
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Figure 3.10: Relative savings between large remote subjects coming from the 95th-percentile
subadditivity
non-coinciding peak hours:
Proposition 1. Let two players have demand given by
Di(t) = Ai cos(2pi
t−Mi
24
) +Bi, t ∈ [0, 24) hours.
whereBi is the mean traffic intensity, Ai+Bi is the peak traffic intensity, andMi is the peak hour
of partner i. By creating a CIPT coalition between these two partners, the relative reduction in
the peak is equal to:
G12 = 1− B1 +B2 +
√
A21 +A
2
2 − 2cosψA1A2
B1 +B2 +A1 +A2
≤ g(ψ),
for ψ = M1−M224 2pi, the scaled time-zone difference, and g(ψ) defined in Equation 3.4.
3.5 Implementation and deployment issues
Section 3.4.4 presented a compelling evidence that CIPT with Shapley-value sharing of transit
costs offers significant benefits to the CIPT partners. While the economic incentives are crucial
for CIPT being viable, the viability is a topic with multiple dimensions. Without pretending to
be comprehensive, this section discusses other aspects of CIPT such as its organizational embod-
iment, physical infrastructure, performance, traffic confidentiality, and interdomain routing.
Organizational embodiment: CIPT is an innovative mechanism for reducing transit costs.
Among other cost-reduction mechanisms, peering is similar to CIPT in its cooperative nature and
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commonly organized as a nonprofit IXP. In our vision for CIPT as an organization, a typical ar-
rangement is also a nonprofit organization. The nonprofit status of a CIPT promotes a valuable
marketplace image of its neutrality and fair treatment for all its partners. In such an organiza-
tion, partnership fees are used only to recover the technical and management overhead costs of
operating the CIPT and expected to be insignificant in comparison to the transit cost reductions
provided by the CIPT. In a future study, we plan to quantify the technical and economic overhead.
While the nonprofit arrangement looks the most suitable, deviations are quite possible and even
likely; as with some existing IXPs, some CIPTs might operate as government or commercial or-
ganizations. Finally, a single AS may choose to participate in multiple CIPTs in order to increase
the provider diversity.
Physical infrastructure: The physical implementation is another issue where CIPTs can
benefit from the IXP experience. For buying IP transit in bulk, a CIPT needs to concentrate traffic
of multiple ASes in one location. The physical infrastructure of any IXP already supports such
concentration for peering purposes. Moreover, some IXPs diversify their service portfolio by
offering access to transit providers. For example, Vancouver Transit Exchange is an IXP that also
hosts transit providers and thereby enables an AS to satisfy its peering and transit needs at the
same location [96]. A CIPT can be implemented as a further diversification of the IXP service
portfolio. By leveraging the physical infrastructure of an existing IXP, the CIPT can keep its
operational costs low.
Performance: A CIPT and its transit provider sign a contract for IP transit. The contract
is expected to be of the same type as existing contracts between an individual AS and its tran-
sit provider. In particular, the contract includes a Service-Level Agreement (SLA) stating the
maximum outage duration, packet delay, jitter, and loss rate for the CIPT traffic. The SLA also
specifies financial compensations by the provider if the latter fails to provide the CIPT with the
agreed performance. In reality, SLA violations are likely to be rare. Whereas the performance
levels of traditional inter-provider SLAs are very similar, having a single SLA for the multiple-
partner CIPT is not problematic. Also, the typical SLA metrics of packet delay, jitter, and loss rate
are such that the traffic of individual CIPT partners can inherit the performance levels of the CIPT
aggregate traffic without any special technical support. Furthermore, the CIPT and its individual
partner can sign a separate bilateral agreement on performance issues.
Traffic confidentiality: While it is feasible to formalize traffic metering and billing for a
CIPT by means of bilateral agreements between the CIPT and each of its individual partners,
the bill of a partner depends on the traffic of the other partners. Some academic ISPs – such as
the aforementioned HEANET, SANET, GRNET and CESNET – reveal their transit and peering
traffic. However, a typical commercial AS tends to be more secretive and does not disclose its
traffic patterns. To alleviate the privacy concerns, a CIPT can keep the traffic profiles of its
partners confidential and incorporate an internal audit system for verifying the correctness of
traffic metering and billing for each partner.
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Interdomain routing: With BGP being a de facto standard protocol for routing between
ASes, we see no technical complications with CIPTs from the interdomain routing perspective.
A CIPT can acquire a separate AS number for inclusion into its BGP path announcements. Alter-
natively, as in the case of some IXPs, the partners of a CIPT can agree to use the individual AS
number of one (typically, prominent) partner in all BGP announcements by the CIPT.
Multihoming and traffic engineering: Both are feasible with CIPT. A CIPT partner can buy
transit outside the CIPT as well. Also, a CIPT can buy transit from multiple providers. While
multihoming might increase costs, CIPT can reduce these costs due to price subadditivity and
burstable billing.
Social impact: The overall social impact of CIPTs appears positive. In particular, CIPTs
are beneficial for narrowing the digital divide between the developed countries and poorer world
which lies on the Internet edges and does not own a transit infrastructure for reaching the Internet
core. In places like Africa, IP transit (and IP transport) is more expensive but the ability to pay
for it is lower. Like with IXPs that have positively affected Africa by exchanging its traffic locally
rather than through North America or Europe, CIPTs can benefit Africa and other developing
regions by making the access to the Internet and its information more affordable [4, 5].
3.6 CIPT: a strategic perspective
In this section, we analyze potential strategic reactions to and within CIPT. While a CIPT
coalition can include members with different market power, more powerful members can try to
gain extra benefits by leveraging their stronger bargaining position against weaker members of
the coalition. Besides, CIPT participation depends on existing or potential transit and peering
relationships. Section 3.6.2 examines such issues related to CIPT formation and participation.
Strategic CIPT issues are also relevant to ASes that are not directly involved in CIPT relation-
ships. Other individual customer ASes can react by forming their own CIPT coalitions. More
interestingly, both the transit provider of the CIPT members and its competitors can adjust their
strategic behaviors in response to the CIPT emergence. Section 3.6.1 studies the reactions of
transit providers.
3.6.1 Transit providers
Whereas transit customers form a CIPT for the simple reason of reducing their costs, the
reaction of transit providers to CIPT is a multifaceted issue. Somewhat counterintuitively, the
transit providers can favor CIPT for a number of reasons.
One potential incentive for an interest of transit providers in CIPT lies in transit traffic elas-
ticity [191]. By decreasing the transit costs of individual buyers, CIPT increases their future
demands. While we had no access to reliable data on transit elasticity, this chapter quantified the
benefits of CIPT conservatively without these extra gains. Also, regardless of whether a transit
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provider is a monopolist, CIPT increases overall demand by turning prospective buyers into ac-
tual customers via aggregation of their individual demands. Moreover, CIPT traffic aggregation
can enable the transit provider to bypass resellers of its transit service and serve small customers
directly through the CIPT. Finally, if the transit provider is not a monopolist, it can adopt CIPT
contracts to attract new customers from its competitors.
Traffic aggregation can allow small customers to pool their traffic together and become at-
tractive customers for transit providers. More generally, direct provisioning of transit to small
customers is sometimes unattractive for big ASes. Instead, mid-size networks resell transit of big
ASes to small customers. By aggregating traffic of multiple small members, a CIPT can reach an
acceptable size for direct transit sales by a big AS. Such outcome can be mutually beneficial for
both the CIPT and transit provider. While this chapter already elaborated on the benefits for the
CIPT members, the transit provider benefits as well by selling the same traffic at higher per-Mbps
prices than through the intermediary. Even though the bypassed intermediary does not find the
CIPT beneficial, the reseller does not have effective means or clear grounds to oppose the direct
relationship between the CIPT and big AS.
Additionally, in situations where the transit market is competitive, a transit provider can try
adopting CIPT to increase its revenues at the expense of its competitors which, in their turn,
can try doing the same. The competition for CIPT contracts drives per-Mbps CIPT prices down.
In Bertrand competition model for homogeneous goods, such competitions converge to the so-
called Bertrand paradox where the competitors offer prices that match their costs, i.e., yield no
profit [189]. In practice, while transit providers are sufficiently heterogeneous (e.g., with respect
to geographic coverage, service quality, and cost structure) to avoid the extreme no-profit out-
come, their actual prices are still likely to be attractive for CIPT coalitions.
In theory, transit providers can also benefit from CIPTs due to a variety of other economic
factors that include transaction efficiency, traffic uncertainty, customer heterogeneity, and pro-
duction postponement [7]. In the current context of IP transit, these factors do not appear to be
strong enablers of CIPT. Thus, we view the traffic aggregation and inter-provider competition as
the two main reasons for the CIPT feasibility from the transit-provider perspective.
3.6.2 Strategic issues within the CIPT coalition
Strategic issues exist within a CIPT coalition as well. One specific issue is CIPT formation,
i.e., which ASes join the coalition. Another interesting issue is CIPT cost sharing, i.e., whether
and how the CIPT members can leverage the Shapley-value cost sharing mechanism for their
individual advantages.
Peering and transit relationships of CIPT members, as well as their position in the transit
hierarchy, are relevant to CIPT formation. Both peering and CIPT are mechanisms for transit-cost
reductions. By reducing transit costs, CIPT can decrease the value of peering. Due to this effect,
ASes with established peering relationships can be reluctant to join CIPTs. For the same reason,
CIPT members can be reluctant to enter peering relationships. This tension between CIPT and
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peering can increase demand for traditional transit and thereby serve as an additional incentive
for transit providers to support CIPT.
As we discuss in Section 3.6.1, CIPT makes a negative impact on bypassed transit resellers.
To compensate for the diminished revenues, a bypassed reseller can itself join a CIPT in order to
minimize the losses.
So far, our analysis considered static situations only. CIPT dynamics broaden the scope of
potential strategic behaviors. For example, if an AS joins a CIPT coalition with a certain traffic
contribution and later communicates at a different rate, the AS traffic change affects the gains
achieved by other CIPT members. To deal with such future traffic uncertainties, CIPT coalitions
can adopt a mechanism that requires each member to commit to an expected traffic level for some
time period.
3.7 Conclusions
In spite of the steady decline of IP transit prices, the IP transit costs remain high due to the
traffic growth. Over the previous decades a number of solutions have been suggested to reduce
these IP transit costs, including settlement-free or paid peering, IP multicast, CDNs, and P2P
localization. In this chapter, we proposed an alternative cost-reduction technique of Cooperative
IP Transit (CIPT) that, in contrast to the existing solutions, does not alter the traffic. Namely, CIPT
utilizes tuangou, or group buying, for IP transit. The savings in CIPT come from two distinct yet
ubiquitous properties of the IP transit pricing model: price subadditivity and burstable billing.
Our data-driven analysis suggested that significant savings can be expected from using CIPT. We
are confident that the potential savings of CIPT, combined with its simplicity, will encourage
many Internet entities to engage in CIPT partnerships.
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While the previous chapter leveraged the economies of scale in interdomain interconnections
to reduce transit bills of ASes, this chapter goes beyond transit. We study the evolved interconnec-
tion ecosystem where transit co-exists with peering. This chapter examines how the economies
of scale can be leveraged in this diversified ecosystem.
In its early years, the Internet ecosystem was essentially a hierarchy where smaller ASes
paid bigger ASes for the universal Internet reachability via transit links. Subsequent massive
emergence of peering enabled many ASes to exchange their customer traffic over cost-effective
settlement-free peering links, leading to the observed Internet flattening phenomena as described
in Chapter 2. The evolution kept increasing the diversity of inter-AS connection types and in-
troduced partial-transit, paid-peering links [70, 191], and remote peering. In contrast to the full
transit, a partial-transit link offers access to only a fraction of the global Internet address space.
With paid peering, one of the peering ASes pays the other peer for exchanging their customer
traffic.
To a large extent, the driving forces behind the interconnection evolution are economic. For
example, if two ASes exchange their traffic via a transit provider, their payments to the provider
significantly exceed the cost of communicating the same traffic over a settlement-free link. The
costs of the peering are mostly related to the infrastructure and labor of maintaining the physical
interconnection, either as a direct link or through an IXP [15,55,58]. The potential of settlement-
free peering to reduce the costs for both peers does not mean that the ASes will indeed establish
and sustain such a relationship. For instance, the ASes might view each other as competitors and
be unwilling to reduce the costs of the counterpart. Furthermore, the costs of each party depend
on the peering-link traffic and AS sizes. Agreements for settlement-free peering commonly stip-
ulate that the traffic flows in the two directions of the peering link should be balanced within a
certain ratio (e.g., ratio 2:1) and that the geographic scopes of the peering networks should be
similar [56]. Loosening the above requirements, a paid-peering interconnection enables peering
of diverse ASes through monetary payments, e.g., by allowing one AS to send more traffic and
pay the other AS a monetary compensation for the traffic imbalance.
Accompanying the interconnection evolution [57], ASes specialized into providing Internet
access to content (i.e., content networks) or residential users (i.e., eyeball networks) [70, 125].
As previously discussed in Section 1, recurrent conflicts over peering settlements [10,25,26,154]
and the net-neutrality debate [127] resulted from the divergent interests of content and eyeball
networks.
In the one hand, asymmetric traffic patterns intensify the cost recovery need of the eyeball
networks, who bear a capital intensive last-mile infrastructure. On the other hand, the high cost of
the last-mile infrastructure represent a significant barrier of entry, that in turn limits competition in
the eyeball-network market and enhances the market power when negotiating a peering agreement
with the content AS [70, 125, 140].
In this chapter, we propose T4P (Transit for Peering), a new type of hybrid bilateral AS
interconnection that can reduce interdomain traffic costs and strengthen the Internet connectivity.
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Figure 4.1: Different types of interconnection between ASes Y and Z: while double-arrow lines
depict traffic flows, single-arrow lines show monetary flows
In T4P, the link between two ASes Y and Z carries not only peering but also some transit traffic.
In particular, AS Z communicates a portion of its transit traffic not through its transit providers
but over the T4P link and through the transit providers of AS Y. While AS Y effectively becomes
a partial-transit provider for this traffic of AS Z, the partial transit serves as an in-kind traffic-
delivery compensation paid by AS Y to AS Z for the peering. Unlike paid peering, T4P does not
employ monetary payments. In comparison to paid peering, T4P is able to reduce the combined
transit/peering costs of an AS due to the subadditivity of transit billing. This chapter uses real
traffic data to demonstrate the cost-reduction potential of T4P.
The main contributions of the chapter are the following ones:
• We propose T4P, a novel type of hybrid AS interconnections where partial transit
serves as a compensation for peering.
• Using real traffic data available at several IXPs, we quantify the financial incentives
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of ASes to adopt T4P.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.1 provides additional background
and motivation for the studied problem. Section 4.2 presents the concept of T4P in more detail.
Section 4.3 reports the economic model and analyzes the AS incentives for T4P adoption. Finally,
Section 4.4 evaluates T4P using the real IXP data.
4.1 Increasing diversity of interconnections
This section presents the background information on the Internet interconnection evolution
that sets the stage for the T4P proposal.
Transit is the interconnection type that was heavily predominant in the early years of the
commercial Internet. A transit link connects two ASes called a provider and customer. As it
was described in the previous chapter, in transit the customer pays the provider for the traffic
communicated in both directions of the interconnection. In exchange for the monetary payments,
the provider offers the customer access to the global Internet. In a typical transit relationship, the
provider is a larger network with a broader geographic scope. Figure 4.1 a shows two examples
of transit interconnections, with ASes Y and Z acting as customers.
Transit billing, presented in the previous chapter (see Section 3.1) is typically subadditive. In
this section we focus in the max transit billing model: the 95th-percentile traffic rate is calculated
for each of the two link directions and the largest of the two 95th-percentile traffic rates serves
as the billed traffic rate. Then, a subadditive price function is applied to the billed traffic rate
to compute the monetary settlement. With the subadditive billing, larger traffic rates are usually
billed at lower transit prices per Mbps.
Settlement-free peering has emerged as a cost-effective interconnection where two ASes Y
and Z exchange their customer traffic directly without any monetary compensation. Whereas the
peering link carries only traffic of own customers, a vast majority of ASes still needs transit links
to reach the global Internet. Nevertheless, by reducing the traffic on the transit links, settlement-
free peering reduces the transit costs for both ASes Y and Z. Figure 4.1b depicts settlement-free
peering.
Despite its definite potential for cost reduction, settlement-free peering has struggled to fully
accommodate the increasingly diverse population of ASes. In particular, the Internet evolution
produced the two AS types of content and eyeball networks with very different profiles in regard to
the number and sizes of customers, dominant direction of traffic flows, cost structure, and market
power. Eyeball networks receive more traffic than they send, serve more users, incur higher
traffic-delivery costs, and enjoy a stronger bargaining position because vendor lock-in is arguably
easier with residential users than with content-providing customers [70, 125]. These differences
make eyeball ASes hesitant to peer with content ASes on the settlement-free basis. For example,
after content provider Netflix became a customer of Level 3, the traffic imbalance on the peering
link between Level 3 and eyeball-network Comcast increased, and Comcast threatened to de-peer
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(i.e., terminate the peering agreement) with Level 3. Although Level 3 offered to resolve the
conflict by upgrading its communication infrastructure and making its routing more beneficial for
Comcast, the latter rejected the offer and de-peered.
Paid peering is a more flexible interconnection that allows AS Y to monetarily compensate
AS Z for their peering. With respect to the traffic flows, paid and settlement-free peering are
identical. Figure 4.1c illustrates paid peering.
4.2 T4P concept
While Section 4.1 exposed the increasing interconnection diversity as well as economic fac-
tors behind this evolution, our T4P proposal continues the diversification trend to find an econom-
ically viable niche in the evolving Internet ecosystem. T4P is a novel type of hybrid bilateral AS
interconnection between diverse ASes, such as content and eyeball networks. Unlike with paid
peering, the T4P interconnection does not involve any monetary settlement. Instead, T4P employs
in-kind compensations in the form of partial traffic transit. Specifically, AS Y compensates AS Z
for their peering by providing a transit service for some traffic of AS Z. Figure 4.1d depicts the
T4P interconnection between ASes Y and Z.
T4P is fundamentally different from paid peering not only because of eliminating any mone-
tary compensation between ASes Y and Z but also due to changes in the traffic flows. While paid
peering is identical to settlement-free peering in restricting the link between ASes Y and Z to own
customer traffic, the hybrid T4P link combines the peering traffic with transit traffic. Hence, the
T4P interconnection affects both transit routes and traffic rates along these routes.
The subadditive nature of transit billing is the reason why T4P is able to reduce the traffic
costs of both ASes Y and Z in comparison to paid peering. Although the overall transit traffic of
ASes Y and Z does not change with T4P, serving some transit traffic of AS Z through AS Y can
decrease the overall transit costs of the two ASes due to the billing subadditivity.
Whereas the subadditive billing can reduce the combined transit/peering costs of ASes Y
and Z, the attractiveness of T4P vs. paid peering for an individual AS depends on the monetary
settlement in the paid-peering interconnection. In particular, AS Z finds T4P more attractive than
paid peering only if the transit bill reduction for AS Z with T4P is at least as large as the monetary
settlement of paid peering.
4.3 Incentive analysis
In this section, we expand and formalize the incentives of ASes to adopt T4P. While we
envision T4P as a cost-effective interconnection between diverse ASes, paid peering serves as a
natural baseline in our analysis.
The lack of real data on paid-peering settlements makes it problematic for our model to ex-
plicitly represent the monetary compensation paid by AS Y to AS Z in the paid-peering inter-
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connection. Instead of treating the monetary compensation as an explicit parameter, our analysis
relies on the key insight that the combined traffic costs of ASes Y and Z are independent from
this monetary compensation: the compensation paid by AS Y is the same as the compensation
received by AS Z. Hence, the first step of our analysis focuses on the overall economic efficiency
of T4P vs. paid peering for the two ASes together.
Our model accounts for the subadditive billing of transit services. The subadditive billing
method is a positive factor for T4P because adding the partial-transit traffic of AS Z to the own
transit traffic of AS Y reduces the price paid by AS Y per Mbps of the aggregated transit. We
consider the method variant that bills the two directions of a link together by applying function
f to the sum of the 95th-percentile traffic rates in the individual directions. In our model, billing
function f always selects the CDR value that yields the smallest possible per-Mbps price for any
traffic pattern. Using i to denote either AS Y or AS Z, we express transit cost Ci of AS i as
Ci = f (Ai) (4.1)
where Ai represents the billed bidirectional traffic pattern.
To represent the transit costs of ASes Y and Z interconnected with T4P, let T denote the
partial-transit traffic on the T4P link, and Wi be the own transit traffic of AS i on the link with its
normal transit provider. Then, transit costs FY and FZ of ASes Y and Z with the T4P intercon-
nection are
FY = f (WY + T ) and FZ = f (WZ − T ) . (4.2)
With paid peering, transit costs Ni of AS i equal
Ni = f (Wi) . (4.3)
Then, transit cost reduction Ri provided by T4P to AS i is
Ri = Ni − Fi. (4.4)
With the subadditive billing, f is a non-decreasing function. Thus, Equations 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4
imply that T4P does not decrease the transit costs for AS Y (i.e., RY ≤ 0) and does not increase
the transit costs for AS Z (i.e., RZ ≥ 0).
We define aggregate T4P gain G as
G = RY +RZ . (4.5)
Combining Equations 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5, we express the aggregate T4P gain as
G = f (WY ) + f (WZ)− f (WY + T )− f (WZ − T ) . (4.6)
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Due to the subadditive billing, the aggregate T4P gain is non-zero in general and depends on
traffic T that AS Z transits through AS Y.
In comparison to paid peering, the overall economic efficiency of T4P for the two ASes to-
gether is better when G > 0. Hence, we have proved the following theorem:
Theorem 1. For the two ASes together, T4P is economically more attractive than paid peering
when
f (WY ) + f (WZ) > f (WY + T ) + f (WZ − T ) . (4.7)
Switching from the aggregate gain to the individual perspectives of ASes Y and Z, one can
think of RZ as a monetary equivalent of the in-kind traffic-delivery compensation provided to
AS Z with T4P. Hence, AS Z favors T4P when RZ is larger than monetary compensation x paid
by AS Y to AS Z in the paid-peering relationship. Even when RZ is strictly greater than x, AS Y
also finds T4P more attractive as long as the transit cost increase (−RY ) of AS Y with T4P is
smaller than x. There is a continuum of such mutually beneficial settings when aggregate gain G
is positive.
4.4 Data-driven evaluation
In Section 4.3, we analyzed AS incentives for adopting T4P. To quantify the economic attrac-
tiveness of the T4P, we evaluate it using real traffic data and real transit pricing. Section 4.4.1
presents our evaluation methodology. Section 4.4.2 illustrates the potential benefits of T4P with
an example. Section 4.4.3 evaluates T4P in more detail.
4.4.1 Evaluation methodology
Similarly to the previous chapter, our evaluation relies on real traffic at the six IXPs presented
in Table 3.4.1.1). Each of the six IXPs in table 3.2 reports peering traffic for its AS members in
the form of network-management images, such as the one in Figure 3.1. Obtained by applying
Optical Character Recognition (OCR) to such images, our numeric data for the peering traffic
serve as a basis for approximating the transit traffic of the member ASes. As in the previous
chapter (see Section 3.4.1.2), we scale up the peering traffic of a member AS with the factor of
1.5 to represent the transit traffic of the AS (real traffic data available at some academic ASes
validate such correspondence between the peering and transit traffic patterns). To evaluate T4P
instances, we consider all possible pairs of ASes at each IXP.
The 95th-percentile billing for transit services utilizes the Voxel prices in Table 3.1 (in Sec-
tion 3.4.1.3 of the previous chapter). Transit providers tend to treat their prices as confidential.
Voxel, a North American AS, is a rare exception and publishes its transit pricing [194]. Table 3.1
sums up the transit prices of Voxel with respect to the CDR chosen by the customer. The tran-
sit payment is calculated as the product of the price per Mbps for the chosen CDR and either
95th-percentile traffic rate or CDR when the latter is larger.
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Table 4.1: Illustrative example of T4P relationships for two ASes at NIX
Interconnection
type
Parameter AS Y AS Z
Paid peering
Billed transit traffic rate, Gbps 7.7 5.6
Transit costs $38K $28K
T4P
Transit traffic rate, Gbps 12.2 1.1
Transit costs $49K $6K
Transit cost reduction −$11K $22K
Maximum compensation
to AS Z
N/A $11K
Maximum compensation
reduction for AS Y
$11K N/A
4.4.2 Illustrative example
In this section, we present an example that illustrates the potential benefits of T4P for a pair of
ASes Y and Z at Neutral Internet eXchange (NIX). The peering traffic of the ASes is imbalanced
with AS Y sending more traffic at the ratio of 4:1.
We examine the T4P instance that maximizes the aggregate T4P gain by shifting 80% of the
transit traffic of AS Z to the T4P link. As shown in table 4.1, T4P decreases the transit costs of
AS Z by $22K but raises the transit costs of AS Y by $11K. Thus, the maximum aggregate T4P
gain attained by T4P is $11K. AS Y can provide up to a $11K compensation to AS Z without
increasing its own overall traffic costs. This amount of G = $11K represents the budget of the
T4P transit-cost benefits that can be distributed between ASes Y and Z in various ways. The other
extreme of this continuum is financially equivalent to settlement-free peering for AS Z: the latter
does not see any changes in its traffic costs but AS Y decreases its overall traffic costs by $11K.
4.4.3 Evaluation results
Now, we take a detailed look at the T4P relationships between all ASes at the six IXPs.
Figure 4.2 shows the distributions of aggregate T4P gain G. Such gains are in addition to those
resulting from peering and arise due to the subadditive billing and the aggregation of transit traffic.
At FICIX, 60% of its AS pairs gain at least $1K, with almost 5% of its AS pairs gaining beyond
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Figure 4.3: Top 20% of the AS pairs with the T4P relationships that have the biggest aggregate
gains across all six IXPs
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$10K. The percentage of AS pairs with G above $1K is greater than 40% for NIX and InterLAN,
and larger than 20% for Budapest Internet eXchange (BIX) and SIX. Israeli Internet eXchange
(IIX) provides the lowest gains among the 6 IXPs, with less than 5% of its AS pairs gaining more
than $1K. Figure 4.3 focuses on the top 20% of the AS pairs with the biggest G across all 6 IXPs.
Around 150 AS pairs gain a larger G than $5K, and about 45 AS pairs gain more than $10K.
4.5 Conclusion
This chapter proposed and evaluated T4P (Transit for Peering), a new type of hybrid bilateral
AS interconnection. In T4P, one AS compensates the other AS for their peering by providing
this other AS with a partial-transit service. Leveraging the subadditive billing of transit services,
T4P offers economic benefits over paid peering and thereby opens new opportunities for AS
interconnections. We modeled and analyzed T4P relationships with paid peering as the natural
comparison baseline. Then, we evaluated T4P based on the real Voxel transit pricing as well
as real traffic data available at the six European IXPs. Our results confirmed the potential of
T4P to expand and strengthen the Internet connectivity through the more flexible cost-effective
interconnection.
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Whereas the previous chapters looked at solutions within the existing interconnection frame-
work, this chapter first identifies inherent limitations of the current framework and then proposes
a novel Internet architecture to overcome those drawbacks.
While the Internet became synonymous with quick transformation of everyday life, network
interconnection contracts in the Internet of 2015 are established in a very old-fashioned way.
Critical for new interconnections are personal contacts, legal teams, and social venues where
taking care of the participants’ subconscious needs [144] is a key aspect.
The current situation with interconnection contracts reflects stagnant practices that have be-
come entrenched over a period of decades. After the infrastructure privatization in the early
1990s, the Internet came to consist of multiple independent networks or ASes. In the Internet
infrastructure owned by multiple parties, global end-to-end reachability requires interconnection
of individual networks. In the multi-party Internet, delivering the traffic of another network is a
service that has its costs and can be provided with different levels of Quality of Service (QoS).
As private for-profit entities, ASes seek compensation for their traffic delivery services and sign
contacts that include an SLA (see Chapter 3). To establish trust and accountability, the SLA de-
termines the interconnection type, service conditions, compensation arrangements, and penalties
for contractual violations.
During the same transition in the 1990s, the main protocol for interdomain routing changed
from the centralized Exterior Gateway Protocol (EGP) [167] to the distributed BGP [92]. Using
BGP, an AS independently decides which traffic-delivery routes the AS offers to its neighbors.
The AS announces the routes to only those neighbors with whom the AS has bilateral intercon-
nection agreements, even when the available physical connectivity is richer.
While the distributed BGP realization of rigid bilateral contracts has promoted the Internet
growth, the traditional interdomain routing suffers from numerous drawbacks exacerbated by
the rapid Internet evolution. These drawbacks include route instability, convergence slowness,
policy inflexibility, and configuration complexity [193, 202]. Although extensive research efforts
have mitigated some of these issues through protocol improvements, new contract types, and new
interconnection facilities, the foundations of Internet routing remain mostly the same.
While BGP has been the subject of much controversy and has suffered many modifications,
we contend that routing challenges in the Internet are fundamental. We contend that some funda-
mental problems of Internet interdomain routing arise due to its contractual model, rather than its
BGP realization. Furthermore, the bulk of work on interdomain routing focuses on improvements
in protocols, rather than in the contractual system that the protocols realize. In the Internet of
many independent infrastructure providers, efficient end-to-end traffic delivery needs coordina-
tion among multiple ASes who may not trust each other.
The current contractual system deals with the problem of trust by relying on rigid bilateral
contracts between neighboring ASes. However, the transitive trust of the bilateral contracts comes
at the expense of routing flexibility and efficiency. Without explicit means for direct coordination
among multiple networks, the realized routing tends to utilize the Internet communication capa-
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city suboptimally, oscillate needlessly, and react inappropriately to traffic-demand changes and
infrastructure failures.
A potential alternative to this status quo is a centralized system, where a trustworthy entity
determines optimal paths based on AS policies. However, this leads to a few concerns: why
should independent ASes support such a centralized system? What is the incentive for ASes to
sacrifice their routing independence?
This chapter proposes Route Bazaar, a contractual system where ASes and their customers
agree on QoS-aware routes without explicit or implicit trust between the networks. The only
trusted entity in Route Bazaar is a public ledger, which is assumed to be trustworthy in the absence
of large corrupted coalitions. While prior work on cryptocurrencies showed how to construct a
decentralized public ledger without a single trusted component, our use of the ledger enables net-
works to check the previous record of each participant in a route before agreeing on the route.
Because the public ledger of Route Bazaar allows anyone to verify the trustworthiness of a net-
work as a routing provider or customer, the verification mechanism incentivizes honest behavior
by all networks and thereby supports effective interdomain routing in an untrusted environment.
5.1 Background
5.1.1 Routing
Current interdomain routing relies on bilateral contracts between ASes, which typically
establish either transit or peering relationships. In a transit relationship, a customer network pays
a provider for reaching the global Internet. Networks can also bypass transit providers and instead
interconnect directly through a peering relationship. In peering, two networks obtain reachability
to a restricted set of Internet addresses: peers only exchange traffic destined to their own networks
and to networks for which they provide transit.
An AS uses BGP to exchange reachability information with neighbors with which it has bilat-
eral contracts. An AS has limited control over the routes of inbound traffic; for outbound traffic,
when multiple neighbors offer paths to the same destination, the AS can choose the neighbor
through which to forward. Most ASes prefer to send outbound traffic through interconnections
that generate revenue (i.e., through transit customers), and avoid using transit providers if an
alternate path through a customer or peer exists.
BGP is fully decentralized and is thus extremely scalable. However, this scalability comes
at the expense of flexibility and responsiveness. In particular, events such as routing policy
changes, misconfigurations, and infrastructure failures can trigger path oscillations and forward-
ing loops [90], and it is nearly impossible to verify that selected paths conform with global rout-
ing policies [81]. For example, BGP hijacking has in the past been used to redirect YouTube’s
traffic to a fake destination in Pakistan [19, 166], and to redirect Spamhaus’s traffic to a hacker
group [174]; in both of these cases a more global view would have alerted ASes to these problems.
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The rapid growth of the Internet, both in terms of users and traffic volumes, and the increasing
diversity of Internet services have strained the existing routing framework. To cope with these
challenges, new types of interconnection contracts have emerged (e.g., partial transit [191], paid
peering [57] and remote peering [36]), IXPs (switching facilities to reduce the costs of peering)
have mushroomed, and BGP has slowly evolved.
However, many of the limitations of Internet routing stem from two root causes. First, con-
tracts must be explicitly negotiated by humans before two ASes can exchange traffic. Thus, in
stark contrast to the dynamic nature of the Internet itself, interconnection negotiations are car-
ried out at human-time scales (sometimes via social events for engineers as mentioned earlier).
Second, these contracts are applied recursively: traffic that an AS sends to its neighbor is then
governed by the contracts of that neighbor. The local (and thus recursive) routing decisions made
by BGP are globally suboptimal due to limited visibility [124].
5.1.2 Cryptocurrencies
Cryptocurrencies, like Bitcoin [141], are secure, decentralized, anonymous digital curren-
cies. These currencies are often built on a public ledger, commonly referred to as a block chain.
The public ledger records transactions and enables checking of the account balance for each user.
Cryptocurrencies have been adopted to new non-monetary uses [45,73,77] that leverage the public
ledger as a decentralized and hard-to-corrupt log.
The public ledger needs to be resilient (i.e., incorruptible) even in the presence of untrusted
participants. Bitcoin’s public ledger is therefore built using a consensus algorithm that is capable
of solving the Byzantine consensus problem [13]. Byzantine consensus is impossible to solve
in asynchronous systems in general and requires at least two thirds of participants be honest.
Moreover, it assumes that the set of participants is well known. Bitcoin solves this latter problem
(that of limiting who can participate) by requiring each participant in the consensus algorithm
to solve a puzzle before voting, and attach a proof-of-work [137] to each vote. Generating this
proof requires the participant to solve a sufficiently hard algorithmic problem. Since generating
this proof requires computational resources, it ensures that the number of votes a malicious user
can generate is in proportion to the computing power they control. Since voting multiple times is
hard, a malicious user needs to instead convince a majority of participants to affect the result of
the consensus algorithm. The lack of aligned interests among malicious parties therefore allows
all users to trust the values stored in the block chain.
5.2 Route Bazaar
In this section, we present Route Bazaar, a novel system for flexible Internet connectivity.
Inspired by cryptocurrencies, Route Bazaar uses a decentralized public ledger to allow mutually
distrustful ASes and customers to establish dynamic, end-to-end QoS-aware paths as overlays
on the existing Internet. In Route Bazaar, the information contained in the public ledger allows
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Provider Pathlet Destination Price Latency SLO Throughput SLO
AS1 f48d4c4 AS2 $50 5 ms (99.9%) 3 Gbps (99.9%)
AS1 d7228c5 AS3 $45 5 ms (99.9%) 3 Gbps (99.9%)
AS2 97dbd13 AS9 $10 10 ms (99.9%) 1 Gbps (99.9%)
AS3 ca22b8a AS9 $20 8 ms (99.9%) 2 Gbps (99.9%)
Table 5.1: Pathlet advertisements in the public ledger.
each participant to verify any participant’s conformance with previous path agreements, while
simultaneously keeping the path agreements private. By relying on a public ledger, Route Bazaar
establishes trust among participants which can compute the likelihood that another participant will
honor a path agreement. Route Bazaar uses standard cryptographic tools to ensure privacy and
existing techniques to establish overlays; our innovation lies in creating a trustworthy environment
for the announcement, selection, and verification of end-to-end paths. In what follows, we assume
that all communications with the public ledger are carried out through authenticated and encrypted
channels, i.e., entities cannot impersonate each other. Several existing protocols (e.g., TLS [59])
can be used to meet this requirement.
In Route Bazaar, a provider is an AS that advertises connectivity over a pathlet (i.e., a path
fragment [80]). A path is formed by composing pathlets leading from a source to a destination. A
customer in Route Bazaar is an entity paying for the end-to-end connectivity provided by a path.
A customer may not be an AS, and might be either the source or destination of the path.
An important aim for Route Bazaar’s design is to minimize the amount of information leaked
about end-to-end paths and customer policies. Our design limits public information to the min-
imum required to support flexible routing via multilateral contracts. First, providers advertise
pathlets using the public ledger. Then, customers compose end-to-end paths by combining the
advertised pathlets. Finally, providers confirm or reject the agreement. We envision that these de-
cisions are made dynamically by automated agents acting on behalf of customers and providers.
Participants can hence enforce sophisticated contractual and routing policies. For instance, Route
Bazaar allows these policies to exploit the historical records about forwarding performance (to
choose providers) and likelihood of payment (to accept a customer) that are maintained in the
public ledger. When all participants agree on a path, the public ledger records an agreement
between the customer and each provider participating in the path.
As the traffic is forwarded along a computed path, the source, destination and each provider
record machine-readable forwarding proofs in the public ledger. These proofs can then be used
to verify that each provider delivered the desired level of service. Customers also record proofs
showing that they have paid providers in the public ledger. The public ledger therefore allows
potential customers and providers to compare previous performance and payment history when
deciding whether or not to trust each other.
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Provider Tag Latency SLO Throughput SLO
AS1 encm(f48d4c4) 5 ms (99.9%) 1 Gbps (99.9%)
AS2 encm(97dbd13) 10 ms (99.9%) 1 Gbps (99.9%)
Table 5.2: Pathlet commitments table in the public ledger. encm(x) here represents the value
output by a PRF with key m and value x.
5.2.1 Routing
Providers advertise pathlets in the public ledger (Table 5.1). Each pathlet advertisement spec-
ifies a tag (used to refer to the pathlet), the source, destination, price and Service Level Objective
(SLO) for throughput and latency. For ease of exposition, here we assume that the pathlet provider
is also the source, however Route Bazaar supports pathlets where the source and provider differ.
A customer composes an end-to-end path between a source and destination by choosing from
the set of advertised pathlets. The customer can enforce routing policies by filtering out policy-
incompatible pathlets. For example, a customer can exclude pathlets advertised by providers who
have previously not met their SLOs. Before a path can be used, each provider must agree to
route traffic along the path; a provider can thus disallow the use of policy-incompatible paths.
For example, a provider might deny service to customers who are unlikely to pay, or reject paths
involving untrusted providers. Policies are enforced by automated agents, who act on behalf of
providers and customers (and are hence aware of their policies) and can exploit the information
contained in the public ledger to judge other participants.
Once the customer and all pathlet providers have agreed on a path, the participants use a
symmetric key generated via key agreement (e.g., Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) [22])
and the pathlets’ tags as input to a cryptographic pseudorandom function (PRF) to generate an
anonymous tag that is valid for only this specific path. Each provider then publishes a pathlet
agreement which includes this encrypted tag, the provider’s identity and the SLO offered by the
pathlet to a pathlet commitments table (Table 5.2) in the public ledger. We use path agreement to
refer to the collection of all pathlet agreements that allow routing along a path. The customer and
providers also agree on a second key that is used to generate an anonymized payment tag (again
derived from the pathlet tag) and prices that are used to record a set of payment agreements
(Table 5.3) between the customer and providers.
This mechanism can accommodate a variety of end-to-end routing models including multi-
path routing [197], source routing [158], opportunistic routing [158] and route repositories [29].
Route Bazaar also allows customers to outsource path computation to trusted third parties, i.e.,
routing as a service [112]. Finally, Route Bazaar supports contractual flexibility, e.g., it can ac-
commodate both cases where the sender pays for connectivity and cases where the receiver pays
for connectivity.
To illustrate how customers can use Route Bazaar to form an end-to-end path, consider a
case where Alice wants to route traffic from a source in AS1 to a destination in AS9. Alice uses
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Customer Pathlet Payment
Alice encn(f48d4c4) encn($50)
Alice encn(97dbd13) encn($10)
Table 5.3: Payment commitments in the public ledger. encn(x) here represents the value output
by a PRF with key n and value x.
Pathlet Packet Hash Timestamp Throughput
encm(source|A6) 50 0a9f136 420 ms 1.2 Gbps
encm(f48d4c4) 50 0a9f136 424 ms 1.2 Gbps
encm(97dbd13) 50 0a9f136 433 ms 1.1 Gbps
encm(destination|A9) 50 0a9f136 433 ms 1.1 Gbps
Table 5.4: Forwarding proofs in the public ledger. encm(x) here represents the value output by a
PRF with key m and value x.
the pathlet announcements in Table 5.1 to find two possible paths that provide this connectivity:
AS1-AS2-AS9 and AS1-AS3-AS9. While the path through AS2 is cheaper ($60 vs $65), the
path through AS3 offers better latency (13ms vs 15ms). In this example, Alice’s policy favors the
cheapest path1, and she therefore decides to route along path AS1-AS2-AS9. If AS1 and AS2
agree to form a path, the three (Alice and both ASes) use ECDH to compute keys m and n. AS1
and AS2 use a PRF with keym to generate anonymized tags, and then update the pathlet commit-
ments table in the public ledger (Table 5.2). Similarly, Alice uses key n to compute anonymized
payment tags, and encrypt prices, and updates the payment commitment table (Table 5.3).
Note that while in the previous example, Route Bazaar allows Alice to exclude paths going
through AS3, this is not generally possible in BGP, where all traffic originating at AS1 and des-
tined to AS9 follows the same path (which might in fact go through AS3). Route Bazaar thus
provides Alice with additional routing flexibility, allowing her to choose paths based on a richer
set of policies.
5.2.2 Forwarding
Once an end-to-end path has been agreed, providers update the data plane as required. Route
Bazaar provides the mechanisms to form and agree on paths as well as to verify that forwarding
conforms with the agreed paths. To verify path conformance, Route Bazaar generates forwarding
proofs that are recorded in the public ledger. Customers, providers and intermediate ASes along
a path use existing techniques for traffic sampling at routers to periodically generate a forwarding
proof. The forwarding proof for a pathlet includes the path-specific anonymized forwarding tag
(a pathlet might be used by several paths), a sample of the traffic, the timestamp indicating when
the sample was captured, and the throughput averaged over the time since the last sample. In
our current design, we envision that each provider sets up Generic Route Encapsulation (GRE)
1Alice could have decided using other policies, e.g., prior history if available, or any other reasons.
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Pathlet Paid
encn(f48d4c4) Yes
encn(97dbd13) Yes
Table 5.5: Payment proofs in the public ledger. encn(x) here represents the value output by a
PRF with key n and value x.
tunnels [91] across each pathlet (to ensure in-order packet transit) and samples a particular packet
(e.g., the 50th packet in Table 5.4). The hash of this packet is used as a traffic sample for the
forwarding proof.
Note that the inclusion of timestamps allows participants to compute the latency reported by a
pathlet’s ingress and egress neighbors. Furthermore, the participants in a path (i.e., the customer,
source, destination and pathlet providers) can use their path key to discover bottlenecks in the
path by observing where a (sampled) packet was dropped. To preserve the anonymity of a path,
this information is not available to non-participants.
When a path’s agreement concludes2, each provider is paid by the customer, and the provider
registers a payment conformation in the public ledger (Table 5.5). The payment proof includes
the pathlet’s anonymized payment tag and a field indicating whether the payment was made.
Alternately, the customer can record its unwillingness to pay in the public ledger, indicating that
appropriate connectivity was not provided.
The payment proofs in the public ledger enable anyone to check customers’ payment history.
These records can also be used for offline arbitration of payment disputes. During such arbitration,
the entities involved in the contract can present the arbitrator with a deanonymized version of the
forwarding and payment proofs.
In the example above, the participants, i.e., the source in AS1, pathlet providers AS1 and AS2,
and the destination in AS9, sample every 50th packet and publish forwarding proofs as shown in
Table 5.4. These ASes rely on NTP (Network Time Protocol) for clock synchronization to ensure
reported times are comparable. Once the path agreement has concluded, Alice pays AS1 and
AS2, and they record her payment in the public ledger as shown in Table 5.5.
5.2.3 Privacy
The privacy offered by Route Bazaar is comparable to BGP. Similar to BGP, Route Bazaar
reveals available paths (as all possible path compositions). This information is identical to what
is available in public repositories, e.g., CAIDA [52]. Furthermore, Route Bazaar does not require
providers or customers to reveal routing preferences and policies.
However, unlike existing interdomain routing solutions, Route Bazaar also reveals
anonymized forwarding and payment proofs. If deanonymized (e.g., due to a compromised par-
ticipant) these proofs expose the precise paths used by customers and the volume of transferred
2In our current design, path agreements are for a fixed volume of traffic.
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traffic. Similar information can be revealed today by sufficiently powerful adversaries (e.g., gov-
ernments or large ASes). Existing mechanisms, e.g., Tor [62] and Unblock [169], for anonymiz-
ing source and destination addresses can be used on top of Route Bazaar to provide stronger
anonymity.
Finally, the forwarding commitments table in Route Bazaar leaks information about which
pathlets are popular, and the amount of overall traffic transmitted across a pathlet. Similarly, the
payments commitment table leaks information about the number of agreements made by each
customer. Route Bazaar can be extended to anonymize this information, so that contracts are
established and verified out-of-band, with Route Bazaar merely serving as a record of past per-
formance. Studying this extension and its properties is left to future work.
5.3 Discussion
Performance Overhead. Route Bazaar imposes minimal overhead on the data plane, requiring
only that routers periodically sample traffic. This feature is commonly supported in most routers
(to aid in debugging), and Route Bazaar does not require the samples to be transmitted in real-
time. The communication overhead imposed by requiring ASes to record forwarding proofs with
the public ledger is relatively small and can be controlled by adjusting the sampling rate. Fur-
thermore, our current design also requires the use of GRE tunnels, these are supported by most
existing interdomain routers.
Because decision making in Route Bazaar is not local, routers merely forward traffic and
are not responsible for control-plane decisions. Instead, control-plane decisions can be done
externally by computers, or at cloud computing facilities. The operations required to access and
update Route Bazaar today is comparable to what is performed by a modern web browser when
connecting to a website over HTTPS [163]. The primary computation overhead during path
computations is therefore a function of the policy complexity, and Route Bazaar’s control plane
therefore imposes modest performance overheads.
Sybil Attacks. Participants can circumvent the trust mechanisms of the public ledger by creating
pseudonymous identities, i.e., they can perform a Sybil attack [64]. While ASes and large organi-
zations (who are the main participants in Route Bazaar) are unlikely to jeopardize their reputation
by forging their identities, Route Bazaar can protect against Sybil attacks by adopting existing
solutions, e.g., SybilGuard [203].
Rich routing policies. Route Bazaar can further enrich its supported routing policies, e.g., by
linking pathlet prices to the customers’ requested traffic volume, payment history, or other condi-
tions. To attract customers, the pathlets can also expose specific salient features of the provided
connectivity, e.g., its Software Defined Network (SDN) implementation. While Route Bazaar
separates routing from forwarding, the main challenge in enriching the routing policies is not
their storage or processing but their expression in a machine-readable language.
Backward compatibility. Because Route Bazaar can operate on top of today’s Internet, it is
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backward compatible with traditional bilateral contracts and BGP routing. Still, Route Bazaar
diversifies contractual options, e.g., by enabling IXP members to exchange traffic not only through
traditional peering agreements but also with contracts formed dynamically via the public ledger.
5.4 Conclusions
The current Internet relies on explicitly negotiated bilateral agreements that are recursively
applied via BGP, leading to rigid functionality and suboptimal routing behavior. In this chapter,
we propose Route Bazaar, an alternative that learns from cryptocurrencies to solve the decentral-
ized trust problem inherent in connectivity contracts. Route Bazaar forms contracts for end-to-end
Internet connectivity orders of magnitude faster and supports highly flexible routing.
Chapter 6
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The previous chapters already mentioned the essential background information. This chapter
takes a broader look at related work.
6.1 Cost reduction techniques
A perennial challenge for ASes has been the unrelenting traffic growth [47, 110] character-
istic for the Internet since its inception. Complicating things further, the main application re-
sponsible for this growth has been changing from web browsing [65] to P2P file sharing [181]
to video streaming [152]. To reduce the transit costs of this skyrocketing traffic, a large number
of approaches have emerged. The existing approaches for reducing the transit costs include AS
peering, IXPs, IP multicast, CDNs, P2P localization, and traffic smoothing.
Peering [15, 56, 120] enables two ASes to exchange their traffic directly, rather than through
a transit provider at a higher cost. IXPs facilitate peering [1, 15, 32, 42, 43] by providing a com-
mon infrastructure for the traffic exchange. To disseminate data to multiple receivers, IP multi-
cast [18, 28, 54, 82, 83] duplicates packets in IP routers and thereby reduces transit traffic. While
IP multicast requires router support from transit providers, CDNs [94, 100, 116, 146, 156, 182]
and P2P systems duplicate data on the application level. Whereas a single company controls a
CDN, a P2P system [149] consists of independent hosts, and P2P localization [49,113,201] strives
to reduce transit traffic without undermining the system performance. Even if the transit traffic
preserves its volume but is redistributed within the billing period to peak at a lower value, the
transit costs decrease due to the burstable billing [61]. An AS can do such traffic smoothing [101]
with rate limiting [134] or in-network storage for delay-tolerant traffic [114]. Remote peering
(Chapter 2) is an emerging approach to deal with high transit costs that allows distant networks
to interconnect at the main Internet hubs.
6.2 Cost sharing
CIPT (Chapter 3) and T4P (Chapter 4) are two novel interconnection types that leverage the
economies of scale in traffic delivery in general and IP transit in particular. While CIPT reduces
the transit costs without altering traffic, T4P reduces the transit costs by redistributing the traffic
over the transit links of the two ASes involved.
We view CIPT as a coalition and use the Shapley value [173] for sharing CIPT costs.
Shair [97] and [33] are cooperative systems that enables phone users to share the committed
but unused minutes and broadband capacity, respectively. Cooperative approaches have also
been studied for cost sharing in IP multicast [11, 72] and interdomain routing [132, 175, 176].
The game-theoretic analyses of the Shapley-value mechanism [11, 72, 139] highlight its group-
strategyproofness and other salient properties but identify its high computational complexity. De-
spite the computational complexity, various proposals of traffic billing between ASes [126, 127],
incentives in P2P systems [138], and charging individual users by access ASes [180] rely on the
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Shapley value. Our evaluation of CIPTs uses the Monte Carlo method to estimate the Shapley
value accurately at a reduced computational cost [118].
6.3 Internet structure
Remote peering, CIPT, and T4P should be viewed in the context of the evolving Internet
ecosystem. With the traffic rising, ASes stablish peering interconnections and bypass transit
providers to reduce transit costs. The Internet has hence developed from a fundamentally hier-
archical net and flattened due to the pervasive peering [56, 78, 121]. In parallel to the growing
diversity of ASes [70], new forms of interconnections have emerged, e.g., partial transit [191],
paid peering [57], and remote peering [36]. While previous research studies only mention remote
peering [1, 43, 87, 159, 178], we are the first to closely examine this emerging type of network in-
terconnection. Our results show wide spread, significant traffic offload potential, and conditions
for economic viability of remote peering.
While resource allocation and corresponding cost recovery in a distributed environment is
a complex matter in general [48], the Internet structural evolution complicated the situation
even further. Although tussles affected the Internet from its early days [51], the growing di-
versity together with the widespread peering resulted in frequent disagreements over peering
cost allocations. Traffic imbalances [143] in peering relationships led to demands of monetary
compensations [58] and to a large set of techniques for minimizing costs and maximizing rev-
enues [20, 145, 180]. The tensions were specially acute between networks that primarily connect
residential users and those networks that connect content providers. Such rifts caused so-called
peering wars [10, 25, 26, 154]. These tussles resulted in heated debates about network neutral-
ity and the role of paid peering in it [53, 55, 75, 88, 125, 129, 184, 200, 205]. Instead of allowing
content provides to subsidize the access of users to the Internet [128], or imposing a fee based on
the different revenue or cost structure as in [125,140], T4P exploits the different cost structure of
heterogeneous ASes and succeeds in reducing overall costs without monetary payments.
The Internet structure is highly important for understanding these tussles as well as network
accountability [8], multihoming [3], routing security [79], traffic delivery economics [20, 21],
Internet governance [178] and various problems in content delivery via overlay systems [31, 66,
94,100,104,130,138,182,204]. However, understanding the Internet structure is a complex task.
For instance, while the arguments that the Internet structure becomes flatter are multifaceted [57,
78, 110], remote peering reveals separation between the trends of increasing peering and Internet
flattening. Also, while analyses of interconnection options are typically restricted to networks
that share a location [41, 172], remote peering enables distant networks to peer over a layer-2
intermediary. While the layer-3 level topologies are known to be inaccurate [147, 198], remote
peering stresses the need for more realistic topologies.
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6.4 Measurement methods
To complicate things further, real interdomain data is difficult to obtain. Because network
operators do not publicly disclose connectivity of their networks, the research community relies
on measurements and inference to characterize the Internet structure [89]. A prominent means for
the topology discovery is the traceroute tool that exposes routers on IP delivery paths [40,44]. For
example, iPlane [131] and Hubble [103] use traceroute to generate and maintain annotated Inter-
net maps. Paris traceroute enhances traceroute with the ability to discover multiple paths [14]. A
complementary approach is to utilize BGP traces [9, 76, 93, 179, 183].
Chapter 2 uses active probing in the data plane to understand the role of remote peering in the
Internet structure. Delay measurements are common in Internet studies, e.g., to study the evolu-
tion of Internet delay properties [115] or Internet penetration into developing regions [69,87]. We
use delay measurements to investigate how geography affects peering of networks and real traffic
data from RedIRIS [160] to evaluate the potential impact of remote peering at the network level.
To evaluate CIPT and T4P, Chapters 3 and 4 take a different approach and approximate transit
traffic by using the peering traffic data obtained by transforming mrtg images published by six
IXPs.
6.5 Routing architectures
The lack of path diversity [50, 190], slow convergence of routing protocols at both the in-
tradomain [23, 185] and interdomain level [68, 85, 108, 109, 133, 148], and the routing table
growth [27,98,136] undermine the scalability of Internet routing [202] and threaten the ability of
the Internet architecture to support future innovations.
Both researchers and practitioners grew increasingly concerned and frustrated with these and
other rigidities inherent to the Internet architecture and proposed alternative frameworks. Route
Bazaar belongs to the recent body of work on novel Internet architectures that overcome funda-
mental shortcomings of the current Internet.
Pathlet routing [80], ICING [142, 170] and Platypus [157] are the proposals most closely re-
lated to Route Bazaar. Similarly to segment routing [171], Pathlet routing proposes a mechanism
where the source can construct paths by composing path segments called pathlets. Route Bazaar
builds on the concept of composable pathlets, but also provides a discovery mechanism. ICING
and Platypus provide different mechanisms for verification of path validity. These mechanisms
can be used to provide proofs in Route Bazaar. As opposed to such schemes, the use of the public
ledger allows Route Bazaar to be used by untrusted networks without any data-plane modifica-
tions.
Similar to SDN, Route Bazaar also decouples the control and data planes. Previous works,
including RCP [71] and 4D [84], suggested such separation for interdomain routing. As opposed
to these proposals, Route Bazaar allows networks to retain private control of their control plane
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and policies. Route Bazaar also enables previous proposals such as routing as a service [111],
opportunistic routing [158], multipath routing [197], and route repositories [29].
Finally, Kadupul [177] proposes a cryptocurrency-based mechanism to enable the routing
of delay-sensitive traffic in wireless mesh networks. Kadupul relies on a proof-of-work mecha-
nism implemented with time-locked puzzles to incentivize nodes to forward traffic. Unlike Route
Bazaar, Kadupul does not attempt to provide mechanisms for path-discovery and cannot be easily
extended to account for QoS.
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We see two general directions for future work. First, while previous chapters examined re-
mote peering, CIPT, T4P, and Route Bazaar, a further analysis of these proposals is worthwhile.
Second, whereas this thesis studied the economic aspects of Internet engineering at the intercon-
nection level, these issues are intertwined with other social, cultural, and political factors that
need to be considered. The given chapter discusses these two general directions for potential
extensions to our prior research.
Remote peering challenged the reliance on layer-3 methods and data to infer the economic
structure of the Internet. Future research will strive to improve topological studies of the Internet
and refine the identification of remote peers. By integrating both layer-2 and layer-3 perspectives,
we will provide a more realistic understanding of the interconnection structure of the Internet.
Geolocation can refine our identification of remote peers as well as clarify the regional patterns
of interconnections and content hosting [2]. However geolocation of remote peers is not straight-
forward. Aggravating the general lack of accuracy of standard IP geolocation databases [153],
such databases fail to identify the actual location of remotely peering networks. Instead, the IP
interface of a remote AS in the IXP subnet appears colocated with such IXP. Triangulation tech-
niques combining topological and delay data [102] constitute a promising technique to reveal the
real location of remote peers.
CIPT proposed a transit-cost reduction mechanism and our future research will look at its
implementation and implications. While this thesis envisioned a simple organizational arrange-
ment where the Shapley-value mechanism redistributes CIPT gains, future work will quantify the
overhead created by CIPT and explore alternative solutions for distribution of CIPT gains. We
will examine whether CIPT can help to reduce the costs of transit in developing countries. Re-
gions located far away from the main hubs of the Internet typically face high transit prices [69].
To make things worse, predominant consumption of non-local content increases the transit costs
further. Despite the emergence of IXPs in developing countries [4], the low volumes of local traf-
fic decrease the potential benefit of peering [87]. By aggregating transit traffic, CIPT can improve
Internet access in the poorly connected areas.
T4P can alleviate the causes leading to peering wars and net-neutrality debates. Net-neutrality
is a complex issue [53] with multi-dimensional implications. Regional specifics such as popula-
tion density, existing laws and infrastructure crucially impact the formulation of the issue. As the
Internet evolves, changing traffic patterns or lower costs of the last-mile infrastructure, might re-
duce the tensions between content and eyeball networks. As online video games, live-streaming,
social media, the Internet of Things (IoT), and cloud storage services gain popularity, the asym-
metry between eyeball and content networks might decrease. New technologies might reduce
last-mile costs and increase competition in the network-eyeball interconnection market. Our fu-
ture work will study the causes and arguments around the net-neutrality debate. We will also
evaluate the extent to which T4P can ease the tensions and whether regulatory solutions are re-
quired.
Route Bazaar is an outline of a novel Internet architecture and certainly deserves further
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research elaborating on its design and implementation. This thesis presented a mechanism for
verification of contracted paths in this new architecture. Future work will develop the rest of
the architectural elements, such as the distributed ledger, and integrate this mechanism in it. An
incentive structure and cryptographic tools to implement the architecture will be also part of our
future work. For backwards compatibility, we will design Route Bazaar as an overlay on the top
of the current Internet architecture.
While the aforementioned extensions of this thesis dwell in the realm of the economic and
technical aspects of the Internet, the emergence of the Internet affects many other areas and is
part of a historical process where social, political, and cultural factors are also fundamental [35].
These issues must be taken into account to have a holistic understanding of the Internet evolution
and its implications. For instance, social and cultural aspects determine to a great extent traffic
flows: e.g., whereas Japan consumes mostly local content, most African countries consume con-
tent created and located abroad [2, 69, 87]. This lack of local content leads to a vicious circle of
inadequate incentives for infrastructure deployment, Internet provision improvement, and local
content creation and hosting. Accordingly, the resulting Internet access inequality has a complex
mix of factors [46] that requires interdisciplinary studies [34, 196].
Also, the change in the applications fueling the traffic growth have social, cultural, and po-
litical underpinnings and implications. As these applications shifted from web browsing, to P2P
file sharing, video streaming and more recently to online video games, live-streaming, social me-
dia, and cloud storage, the traffic patterns and costs changed, and new agents emerged. This
dynamism challenges the current Internet architecture. Exploring how the bottom-up approach of
the Internet governance [178] can match this dynamism is also a multi-dimensional endeavor that
spans several disciplines. We look forward to integrating these views in future research.
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This thesis analyzes how networks interconnect in the current Internet and which limitations
its interconnection framework has. In doing so, the thesis looks at the evolution of the Internet
economic structure and investigates four different but related topics: remote peering, CIPT, T4P,
and Route Bazaar.
The early Internet was a publicly owned infrastructure with a relatively small number of con-
nected networks and end users. Since its inception in the 1960s, the Internet has developed into
a massive decentralized ecosystem providing end-to-end connectivity for a multitude of diverse
users and services. As the traffic grew, the ASes’ attempt to curb rising transit costs transformed
the Internet. Evolving from a predominantly hierarchical structure where few networks provided
universal connectivity, the Internet became a flatter structure with direct peering connections by-
passing transit providers. Because expanding the network infrastructure to connect through peer-
ing links was financially burdensome, large content providers pioneered this trend.
Remote peering emerged as a cost-efficient solution where an AS peers with distant networks
without having to bear the costs of physical presence at a common location. In revealing the
spread of remote peering, this thesis exposed a long-term trend of the Internet ecosystem towards
more flexible interconnections. At the same time, by unveiling the wide adoption of remote
peering, we demonstrated the shortcomings of the typical layer-3 modeling of the Internet.
With more and more networks joining the Internet, interdomain interconnections struggled
with increasingly heterogeneous interconnection needs and unrelenting traffic growth. CIPT and
T4P are two novel interconnection types that continue the trend of interconnection diversification.
CIPT presents an alternative way to reduce transit costs. While most interdomain intercon-
nections are bilateral, CIPT is a multilateral and cooperative approach that reduces transit costs
for all the ASes involved. CIPT savings result from two properties of the IP transit model: price
subadditivity and burstable billing. To redistribute the savings fairly we use the game-theoretic
concept of Shapley value. By benefiting all the ASes participating in a CIPT, this interconnection
can appeal to ASes of many different types.
T4P is a mechanism that leverages the heterogeneity of networks to reduce the intercon-
nection costs. The difficulties to satisfy the frequently diverging needs for the plethora of actors
comprising the Internet, triggered recurrent economic conflicts over the settlement of interconnec-
tions. In particular, the highly asymmetric traffic patterns between eyeball and content networks
sparked disputes about whether one network should compensate the other for their peering. This
conflict provoked frequent peering disruptions and ultimately resulted in the network neutrality
debate. T4P alleviates the pressures leading to this conundrum: by redistributing the traffic of
two ASes over their respective transit links, T4P reduces the overall interconnection costs of the
two networks. The cost reduction can then be shared or allocated to the network demanding a
compensation for the peering.
While remote peering, CIPT, and T4P strengthen Internet connectivity and reduce frictions
and financial burdens, some of the limitations of the Internet are inherent to its current architec-
ture. The flexibility of the current Internet architecture is limited by the very same features that
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enabled its scalability: distributed routing via local decision making (BGP) and rigid intercon-
nection contracts.
Route Bazaar takes a radical departure to overcome the drawbacks of the current Internet ar-
chitecture. Inspired by the use of block chains and cryptographic tools in cryptocurrencies, Route
Bazaar proposes a new Internet architecture that provides flexible interconnections, supports rich
interconnection policies, and accommodates automatic multilateral contract establishment, termi-
nation and enforcement.
This thesis sheds light on the continuing Internet evolution with respect to the interconnection
diversification and overall structure changes. While remote peering is a phenomenon that has been
massively emerging in the Internet over the past decade, CIPT and T4P are two novel intercon-
nection types that continue the diversification trend toward more flexible interconnections. Route
Bazaar goes one step further and tackles the inherent limitations of the current interconnection
framework by replacing it with a novel Internet architecture. However remote peering, CIPT, T4P,
and Route Bazaar do not exhaust the possibilities for addressing the challenges faced by the Inter-
net. For instance, novel interconnections might appear, and SDN-enabled routing [17,106,192] or
new technologies (e.g., 5G) might ease some of the existing drawbacks. At the same time, some
current challenges might fade away while new ones emerge. As the Internet evolution keeps
changing the applications responsible for the traffic growth, the Internet economic structure will
likely evolve to adapt to it. For example, online video games, live-streaming, social media, IoT,
and cloud storage services can reduce the asymmetry between eyeball and content networks. As
new challenges appear, and the Internet evolves to cope with them, new techniques to understand
those changes and new solutions to address the bottlenecks will be necessary. While the chal-
lenges are many and have political, social, cultural, and economic aspects, this thesis contributed
to the understanding of the current Internet economic structure and proposed solutions to allevi-
ate the existing drawbacks. Looking into political, social and cultural aspects will be necessary to
address the new and existing challenges.
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